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A4NH – CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health 
CBO – Community-based organization 
CCAFS – CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security  
CRP – CGIAR Research Program 
DISCOMs – Electricity distribution companies 
DSC – Development Support Center  
DSUUSM – Dhundi Saur Urja Utpadak Sahakari Mandali 
EQ – Evaluation question 
GERMI – Gujarat Energy Research and Management Institute 
GESI – Gender equality and social inclusion 
GHG – Greenhouse gases 
GIZ –Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
GUVNL – Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited 
GW – Gigawatts 
hp – Horsepower 
ITP – IWMI-Tata Water Policy Research Program 
IWMI – International Water Management Institute 
KUSUM – Kisan Urja Shakti evam Utthan Mahabhiyan 
kV - Kilovolt 
kW – Kilowatt 
MGVCL – Madhya Gujarat Vij Company Limited 
MNRE – Ministry of New and Renewable Energy 
MW – Megawatts 
NDDB – National Dairy Development Board 
NGO – Not-for-profit organization 
NPV – Net present value 
PMKSY – Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana 
PV – Photovoltaic 
REIL – Rajasthan Electronics and Instruments Limited 
RTB – CGIAR Research Program on Roots, Tubers and Bananas  
SDC – Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
SIPs – Solar irrigation pumps 
SKY – Suryashakti Kisan Yojana 
SoLAR-SA – Solar Irrigation for Agricultural Resilience in South Asia 
SPaRC – Solar power as a remunerative crop 
SPICE – Solar Pump Irrigators’ Cooperative Enterprise 
ToR – Terms of reference 
WLE – CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems 
 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Champion – Someone who sees value in an outcome trajectory and engages with decision makers to 
strengthen it. 




Energy-water-agriculture nexus – The long-running difficulty in finding financially and economically 
viable and politically acceptable solutions to the problems of providing highly subsidized electricity for 
pumping and avoiding overextraction of groundwater while allowing farmers’ incomes to increase. 
Feeder – The line from a step-down transformer (400 kV) out to farms. 
Initiative – Coherent sets of activities such as breeding, dissemination, policy engagement and 
technical support that may or may not be project-related. 
Outcome – A change in behavior (practices, relationships) or policies (that influence behavior) of 
individuals, groups, organizations or institutions. 
Outcome-evidencing approach: An adaptation of outcome harvesting in which a case is built and 
challenged as to whether a program has contributed to one or more outcome trajectories. 
Outcome trajectory – The pattern of interactions and causal links between actors, technologies and 
institutions that maintain and scale a coherent set of outcomes over time, e.g., the inclusion by the 
Government of India of SPaRC in the USD 50 billion KUSUM scheme. 
Solar power as a remunerative crop (SPaRC) – Approaches by which farmers are able to sell solar 
power back to the grid and earn by doing so. 
Social norms – Collective representations of acceptable group conduct as well as individual 
perceptions of particular group conduct. They can be viewed as cultural products (including values, 
customs and traditions) that represent individuals’ basic knowledge of what others do and think that 
they should do. 
WLE/CCAFS outcome – An outcome to which WLE/CCAFS have contributed.  
 





This summary extracts the conclusions and recommendations from an evaluation of the outcomes from 
the work of the CGIAR Research Programs (CRP) on Water, Land and Ecosystems (WLE) and Climate 
Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS). It is intended to serve as a stand-alone summary, as 
well as to direct readers to a more detailed description of the methodology, evidence and findings in 
the main report. 
 
Introduction 
WLE and CCAFS are global research-for-development programs supported by CGIAR, a global research 
partnership for a food-secure future.  
 
In seeking to learn, improve and be more accountable, WLE has carried out three outcome evaluations 
in recent years, of which this is the third. The first two were on resource recovery and reuse in Ghana 
and Sri Lanka, and on WLE’s water and soil outcomes in Ethiopia. 
 
This evaluation concerns a significant policy outcome, specifically the CRP contribution to the 
incorporation of an approach to solar irrigation – solar power as a remumerative crop (SPaRC) – in 
two government programs: the Indian government’s USD 50 billion Kisan Urja Shakti evam Utthan 
Mahabhiyan (KUSUM) initiative and the Gujarat State government’s Suryashakti Kisan Yojana (SKY) 
scheme. The intention of KUSUM, the bigger of the two programs, is to help 2 million farmers adopt 
SPaRC by 2022 in expectation of much wider adoption thereafter.  
 
The IWMI-Tata Water Policy Research Program (ITP) has worked on SPaRC since 2012 with support 
from WLE and CCAFS, among others. WLE and CCAFS decided to jointly commission this evaluation to 
better document and understand their respective contributions to the outcome, as well as to gain a 
sense of the likely impact of SPaRC under different adoption and usage scenarios.  
 
The primary intended users of the evaluation are decision makers in WLE and CCAFS who are 
interested in better understanding how CGIAR research and other forms of intervention contribute to 
policy outcomes. Intended users also include staff from donor organizations; staff from other CRPs; 
and national partners and stakeholders working to scale up beneficial technologies and institutions. 
More generally, the report’s findings and conclusions will be relevant to anyone who wants to better 
understand mechanisms by which research can contribute to developmental impact. 
 
Methodology 
This evaluation uses a version of outcome harvesting called outcome evidencing (Paz-Ybarnegaray and 
Douthwaite 2017), which was successfully used for an evaluation of WLE outcomes in Ethiopia 
(Douthwaite and Getnet 2019). Outcome evidencing is a theory-driven approach that is based on the 
presumption that outcomes result from evolving patterns of interactions between people, 
technologies and institutions. These patterns are called ‘outcome trajectories.’ Programs contribute 
to catalyzing, stabilizing and amplifying these patterns. Outcome evidencing is about describing and 
validating outcome trajectories and a program’s contribution to them. This evaluation is of WLE’s and 
CCAFS’ contribution to the outcome trajectory that has led to SPaRC being adopted by the KUSUM 
and SKY programs. An existing theory of how policy change occurs – policy window theory – was used 
to help identify and understand underlying causal mechanisms. 
 




The evaluation addressed five questions: 
1. How can the policy window theory be made more specific to the SPaRC outcome trajectory 
so as to help answer subsequent evaluation questions 2, 3 and 4? 
2. What were WLE and CCAFS solar irrigation outcomes in India and how did WLE and CCAFS 
contribute to them? 
3. Did WLE and CCAFS help influence/contribute to the design and promotion of research that 
integrates/considers gender or the needs of marginalized groups within its partner centers? 
4. Are WLE and CCAFS outcomes likely to be sustainable over the long term? 





Conclusion 1: Since 2012, CGIAR has catalyzed and played a key role in an outcome trajectory by which 
the idea of SPaRC gained recognition, became seen as workable, and has been adopted as one of the 
three components of the USD 50 billion Government of India KUSUM scheme.  
 
Conclusion 2: The policy window theory helped understand how CGIAR contributed to the trajectory 
by: 
 Framing SPaRC as a potential solution to at least five politically important issues;  
 Maintaining and exercising the capacity to present, demonstrate and write about SPaRC in 
ways that together proved extremely effective at influencing government policy; 
 Forming partnerships and a coalition to help create a more enabling environment for SPaRC; 
 Identifying and answering research questions, the timely answer of which is needed to help 
SPaRC compete against other ways of solarizing mechanical irrigation that are less beneficial 
to farmers and the environment, but easier to implement. 
 
Conclusion 3: WLE, CCAFS, Tata Trusts, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) together made a strong contribution 
to the SPaRC outcome trajectory:  
 WLE funded International Water Management Institute (IWMI) senior scientist time to engage 
in SPaRC work, in particular to write the articles and papers and attend the key events that 
helped SPaRC gain recognition among policy makers;  
 CCAFS funded and made possible the Dhundi pilot initiative that proved catalytic in moving 
the perception of SPaRC from a good idea in theory to an approach that worked on the ground, 
deserving inclusion in KUSUM; 
 Tata Trusts funded other costs associated with attending key events; bonuses to SPaRC pilot 
farmers; and ITP interns who did the field work and data collection; 
 SDC provided significant additional funding support, including funding the four-country IWMI-
led Solar Irrigation for Agricultural Resilience in South Asia (SoLAR-SA) project from 2019; 
 GIZ funded the Solar Irrigation Expansion in India Partnership to develop tools and case studies 
for solar irrigation promotion at scale, in particular for SPaRC. 
 
Conclusion 4: By far the largest project supporting the SPaRC outcome trajectory – SoLAR-SA – has 
brought a strong emphasis on gender equality and social inclusion (GESI). This is manifest in addressing 
two policy-relevant questions in particular: 
 How have current solar irrigation policies and programs impacted on farmers’ livelihoods and 
gender equity? 
 Which financial model generates maximum willingness among small-scale and marginal 
farmers to adopt solar irrigation? 




The project has influenced the design of other solar irrigation projects that have also adopted a strong 
GESI focus. 
 
Conclusion 5: The SPaRC outcome trajectory clearly shows that influencing policy is a route to scale, 
which is important for CGIAR. ITP has been very effective in influencing solar irrigation policy. Despite 
this, ITP is unique in CGIAR in the following ways: 
 Its equal partnership between a CGIAR Center (IWMI) and a foundation concerned with 
development (Tata Trusts); 
 Its objective to help policy makers at all levels address their water challenges by translating 
research findings into practical policy recommendations – this is not a research objective but 
rather one that speaks to bridging research and development; 
 Its employment of people with a management rather than a research background; this aligns 
well with ITP’s mandate for ‘problem-solving’ research with a strong bias toward field action; 
 Its practice of giving more credit for policy-relevant publications than academic ones; 
 Its level of comfort with policy engagement. 
ITP is a bridging organization (Davila et al. 2006),1 a type of organization that is identified in the 
literature as important for research impact (Ekboir 2009). There is much for CGIAR to learn from ITP’s 
experience should it wish to see a greater return on its research investment through influencing policy. 
 
Conclusion 6: It is useful to think of KUSUM, and the political imperative to tackle the energy-water-
agriculture nexus (see Finding 12), as creating an ecosystem in which various versions of KUSUM’s 
three options, as well as others, will compete in an evolving, complex and inherently uncertain 
process. Which versions find niches, where and whether they help India tackle the nexus, will depend 
on the timing and quality of decision making. The evaluation team has developed a simulation model 
to help, in a small way, decision makers to gain a better sense of likely outcomes for states, starting 
with Gujarat, adopting KUSUM-C and/or KUSUM-A.  
 
Conclusion 7: The simulation model shows that under expected conditions, KUSUM-C gives better 
outcomes for farmers, electricity distribution companies (DISCOMs), groundwater extraction and 
reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than KUSUM-A. KUSUM-C is likely to face the strongest 
competition from KUSUM-A if:  
• Subsidies are decreased or removed; 
• Loans are decreased; 
• Tariff prices are reduced; 
• Demand and price are high for buying water (e.g., cash crops); 
• Non-payment by DISCOMs becomes prevalent; 
• Groundwater is not limiting; 
• Local institutions are weak; 
• Land for solar banks is available; 
• Daytime power is made available. 
 
Conclusion 8: By far the greatest benefit derived from both KUSUM-A and -C is the reduction of GHG 
emissions by replacing fossil fuel use with solar power generation, when a notional price is paid for 
reducing CO2 emissions. GHG emission reductions are large in both KUSUM-A and -C. KUSUM-C’s 
unique attraction is that it can deliver other benefits, including increased farmer income, reduction in 
farm power subsidies and incentives for farmers to become energy and water efficient. 
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Recommendation 1: For ITP to continue to play a central role in the SPaRC outcome trajectory. 
Given the potential impact of SPaRC, and the huge return on research investment that this would 
bring, WLE, IWMI, CCAFS and Tata Trusts should continue to support ITP in playing a central role in 
the SPaRC outcome trajectory. The policy window theory and progress to date suggest the following 
strategies are likely to be beneficial: 
 Maintaining the reputation of ITP so it is invited to present to high-level decision makers; 
 Maintaining the ability to take advantage of policy windows; 
 Forming partnerships to build capacity to establish solar cooperatives at scale; 
 Carrying out research to support the adaptation and evolution of SPaRC to maximize its 
benefits, in particular to marginalized groups; 
 Strengthening a coalition of actors who believe in SPaRC as a way to tackle the energy-water-
agriculture nexus. 
 
Recommendation 2: For WLE and CCAFS to propose a synthesis across recent outcome evaluations 
as to how programmatic research has achieved impact at scale, to inform the move to One CGIAR. 
Several CRPs have invested in outcome evaluations since 2019, including WLE, CCAFS, RTB (CGIAR 
Research Program on Roots, Tubers and Bananas) and A4NH (CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture 
for Nutrition and Health). At the same time, CGIAR is going through a reorganization to become One 
CGIAR such that scientific innovations are deployed faster, at a larger scale and at a reduced cost, 
having a greater impact where they are needed the most. 2 It would therefore be timely to carry out a 
synthesis across the evaluations to appreciate and learn lessons from what has worked. For example, 
this and the RTB/A4NH evaluation show that influencing policy is clearly important for achieving 
impact at scale, and advocacy is important for achieving policy change. CGIAR is generally 
uncomfortable with explicitly engaging in advocacy. Learning from how CRPs have successfully 
supported advocacy efforts, regardless of whether the term was used, would likely yield worthwhile 
lessons for One CGIAR. 
 
Recommendation 3: For WLE and CCAFS to support the handing over of the simulation model to ITP 
The simulation model is easily accessible as a native Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with a linked input 
data sheet and includes a dashboard with the graphical display of results and a facility to easily 
simulate various policy scenarios. The model input datasheet can be readily edited to apply the model 
to different states in India. As better data become available, especially for sensitive variables, such as 
adoption rates, the uncertainties in projected benefits will be reduced. Hence the model can be used 
as a learning tool and the projection of benefits updated regularly over time. The use of SIPmath tools 
for Excel makes it relatively easy for a graduate-level analyst to build new assumptions into the model. 
With further effort, additional solar models could also be added. ITP has had exposure to the model 
and has the technical knowledge to parameterize the input distributions. We recommend that WLE 
and CCAFS support the handing over of the simulation model to ITP and consider further training and 
technical support to help develop ITP’s capacity in its use. 
 
Recommendation 4: For the CGIAR System Organization to consider whether the simulation 
modeling approach used in this evaluation has broader applicability 
Additional data or information from applied research have no value unless they improve decision 
making – for example, decisions on what interventions should be promoted to provide the most 
favorable livelihood and environmental outcomes at least cost and risk. It is impossible to know what 
research will produce value without first quantifying the current state of uncertainty and then seeing 
                                                          
2 https://www.cgiar.org/food-security-impact/one-cgiar/ 




which uncertainties are critical for outcomes. There is also strong demand from donors and other 
stakeholders for CGIAR to project and monitor benefits. 
 
In this evaluation, the simulation modeling approach required researchers to quantify their 
assumptions and uncertainty in adoption, costs, benefits and risks associated with alternative solar 
irrigation models. We think this process of quantifying the theory of change led to deeper thought and 
analysis on causal factors affecting adoption and impact of solar irrigation alternatives than would 
otherwise have been the case. The modeling identified several priority areas for research and 
monitoring, based on where uncertainty reduction would most affect projected outcomes.  
 
The SIPmathTM open-standard approach used in this study could provide the foundation for an 
enterprise-wide platform for representing uncertainty and including uncertainty and risk in cost-
benefit analysis. SIPmathTM is readily accessible to everyone in Excel but is also applicable across 
platforms (e.g., R, Python). We therefore recommend this approach for consideration as a CGIAR-wide 
complement in ex-ante and ex-post impact evaluations, and for use in research project screening at 
various stage gates based on projected benefits. 
 





This evaluation is one of a series of learning-focused outcome evaluations being undertaken by the 
CGIAR Research Program (CRP) on Water, Land and Ecosystems (WLE) to better understand how its 
research-for-development approach has worked, for whom and to what extent. Two evaluations have 
so far been completed: one on resource recovery and reuse in Ghana and Sri Lanka, and another on 
WLE’s water and soil outcomes in Ethiopia. 
 
This evaluation was commissioned through an open, competitive call for proposals which was won by 
Selkie Consulting Ltd to use the same theory-driven outcome-harvesting approach used for the WLE 
outcome evaluation in Ethiopia (Douthwaite and Getnet, 2019). The main modification is the addition 
of an ex-ante modeling component that will make projections about future impact.  
 
Purpose and Objectives  
The purpose of the evaluation, as given by the evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR), is to facilitate 
learning among intended users on: 
1. How WLE/CRP on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) work on solar-
powered irrigation is catalyzing change; 
2. The likely impact under different adoption and usage scenarios. 
 
The objectives of the evaluation are to: 
1. Determine and document how evidence from WLE/CCAFS research and engagement activities 
contributed to the achievement of intended and unintended outcomes, in particular, the 
incorporation of the solar power as a remunerative crop (SPaRC) model in the Government of 
India’s large Kisan Urja Shakti evam Utthan Mahabhiyan (KUSUM) program; 
2. Establish, based on findings of the evaluation, what has changed at the farmer level as a result 
of implementing the SPaRC model, for whom and why, including any measurable short-term 
benefits; 
3. Calculate, using ex-ante simulation/modeling, the projected benefits at various time intervals 
(e.g., 2022 and 2030), and create a set of alternative scenarios;  
4. Serve as a participatory learning experience for WLE and CCAFS and their partners. 
 
Intended users 
The primary intended users of the evaluation are decision makers in WLE and CCAFS who are 
interested in better understanding how CGIAR research and other forms of intervention contribute to 
policy outcomes. Intended users also include staff from donor organizations; staff from other CRPs; 
and national partners and stakeholders working to scale-up beneficial technologies and institutions. 
More generally, the report’s findings and conclusions will be relevant to anyone who wants to better 
understand mechanisms by which research can contribute to developmental impact. 
METHODOLOGY 
This evaluation uses a version of outcome harvesting called outcome evidencing (Paz-Ybarnegaray and 
Douthwaite 2017) which was successfully used for an evaluation of WLE outcomes in Ethiopia 
(Douthwaite and Getnet 2020). Outcome evidencing is a theory-driven approach that is based on the 
presumption that outcomes result from evolving patterns of interactions between people, 
technologies and institutions. These patterns are called ‘outcome trajectories.’ Programs contribute 
to catalyzing, stabilizing and amplifying these patterns. Outcome evidencing is about describing and 
validating outcome trajectories and a program’s contribution to them. This evaluation is of the 
outcome trajectory that has led to SPaRC being adopted by government-backed initiatives to solarize 
irrigation pumping in India. 
 




The SPaRC outcome trajectory is the changing pattern of interactions between people, institutions 
and technology that has led to the inclusion of SPaRC into Gujarat’s Suryashakti Kisan Yojna (SKY) 
program and the Government of India’s USD 50 billion PM-KUSUM (Pradhan Mantri KUSUM) program.  
 
The evaluation is formative and developmental in nature, in response to the purpose of the evaluation 
to facilitate learning among intended users. In the literature, developmental evaluations are 
positioned as an internal team function integrated into the process of gathering and interpreting data, 
framing issues and testing model developments.3 Two IWMI-Tata Water Policy Research Program (ITP) 
staff members, Shilp Verma and Gyan Rai, provided extensive input into the evaluation, including 
identifying and explaining various aspects of the outcome trajectory; helping to identify and secure 
interviews with key stakeholders; helping to convene two stakeholder workshops; helping to identify 
key ITP publications; and as co-developers of the simulation model developed by the evaluation. The 
external evaluators – the two authors of this report – brought an external perspective manifest in 
seeking to double-check what they were being told through interviews and document review, in 
particular of online publications found though Googling the events and concepts described as 
important in interviews. 
 
The evaluation is theory-driven in that the evaluation team assumes that the outcomes achieved by 
the work on SPaRC can be explained by existing theory. The assumed theory is the policy window 
theory described by Stachowiak (2013), originating from the field of political science (Kingdon and 
Stano 1984). The theory was chosen because the main SPaRC outcomes relate to policy, and the 
theory has been found to usefully apply in evaluations of other CGIAR contributions to policy 
processes (Douthwaite, in preparation). Policy window theory is what the Realists call middle-range 
theory, positioned between universal social laws and more location- and context-specific program 
theory/theory of change (Pawson 2013). 
 
The policy window theory proposes that policy changes during windows of opportunity help advocates 
successfully connect two or more components of the policy process. The components are:  
 The way a problem is defined;  
 The policy solution to the problem; 
 The politics surrounding the issue (Stachowiak 2013; Sabatier and Weible 2007).  
 
Windows of opportunity are moments when progress can be made. They can be created by natural 
events such as pandemics, droughts or earthquakes; for example, an earthquake is an opportunity to 
change building regulations. They can be anthropogenic events like spikes in air pollution that lead to 
changes in clean air regulations. They can also be changes in government or budget cycles, or landmark 
meetings and summits held as part of ongoing national, regional or global processes. Individuals can 
create policy windows by, for example, organizing a side event at a global meeting. Policy windows 
are often short in duration and may be predictable or unpredictable. 
 
Policy window theory has been criticized for overly focusing on problem identification at the start of 
the policy cycle and ignoring the complex steps that follow involving stakeholders that hold 
confounding positions (Jann and Wegrich 2007). Our view is that this criticism does not apply to our 
evaluation approach because we work with the premise that policy change happens as a result of an 
outcome trajectory, that is, through the actions and interactions of stakeholders together with 
institutions and technology. Also, we use Stachowiak’s (2013) depiction of the theory, which includes 
effort to develop policy solutions, strengthen organizational functional capacity and influence political 
will. 
 
                                                          
3 https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/developmental_evaluation 




Stachowiak (2013: 7) made a number of qualifying statements with respect to the theory of change: 
 Often there are many competing ideas on how to address problems. To receive serious 
consideration, policy solutions need to be seen by policy makers as technically feasible and 
consistent with public values; 
 The way a problem is defined makes a difference to whether and where the problem is placed 
on the agenda. Problem definition also has a value or emotional component; values and 
beliefs guide decisions about which conditions are perceived as problems; 
 Advocates can attach their solution to an existing problem that has gained prominence on the 
agenda, even if that prominence is independent of their efforts; 
 To effectively recognize and take advantage of open policy windows, advocates must possess 
knowledge, time, relationships and good reputations; 
 Policy is translated into action plans that are implemented. 
 
Figure 1. Policy window theory as to how policy changes, chosen as the best fit to describe how 
biofortification is being mainstreamed in the African Union (AU) (redrawn from Stachowiak 2013). 
 
 
The evaluation is driven by the following set of questions. Questions 2 to 5 were provided in the ToR 
for the evaluation and represent what the main intended users want to learn from the evaluation. 
Question 1 relates to the choice of the policy window theory made after the evaluation began. The 
evaluation questions (EQs) are as follows: 
1. How can the policy window theory (see Figure 1) be made more specific to the SPaRC outcome 
trajectory so as to help answer EQs 2, 3 and 4? 
2. What were WLE and CCAFS solar irrigation outcomes in India and how did WLE and CCAFS 
contribute to them? 
3. Did WLE and CCAFS help influence/contribute to the design and promotion of research that 
integrates/considers gender or the needs of marginalized groups within its partner centers? 
4. Are WLE and CCAFS outcomes likely to be sustainable over the long term? 
5. Looking forward to 2022 and 2030, what are the projected benefits for people and the 
environment? 
 
EQs 2, 3 and 4 were addressed through the following steps. 
1. The evaluation team carried out in-depth interviews with 19 key actors listed in Appendix 3 
and a thorough document review to cross-check the information provided in the interviews.  




2. The interviews and document review were used to develop both a timeline of the outcome 
trajectory and a narrative history, including rich, thick descriptions of important suspected 
causal aspects.  
3. The timeline and history were used to develop the SPaRC outcome trajectory theory of 
change, based on policy window theory.  
4. At the same time, policy window theory was used to focus the timeline and history. It did this 
by focusing inquiry as to how ‘shifts in social norms,’ ‘increased capacity,’ and ‘strengthened 
support base’ manifest themselves in the outcome trajectory.  
5. The majority of the interviewees attended a workshop in which they validated and added to 
the timeline. They also commented on the validity of findings generated while answering EQ 
1.  
6. The timeline, history and specified theory of change were finalized after the workshop, after 
which all three were used to answer EQs 2, 3 and 4.  
 
The insight developed in the process just described was used to inform the design of the simulation 
model used to answer EQ 5.  
 
EQ 5 required the evaluation team to make projections about what impact the SPaRC model could 
have by 2022 and 2030 with respect to five indicators: 
1. Number of people using clean energy in irrigation;  
2. Number of people deriving additional income from surplus solar power sales; 
3. Number of hectares irrigated with systems that use clean energy sources; 
4. Change in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a result of the implementation of the SPaRC 
model; 
5. Net present value, return on investment and risk metrics through a risk-return analysis. 
 
The evaluation team used the understanding of the SPaRC outcome trajectory generated in answering 
EQ 1 to develop a scenario-building model of the main factors influencing adoption, major costs, 
benefits and risks. This model was used as part of a probabilistic risk-return approach (Luedeling and 
Shepherd 2016) that quantifies the current state of uncertainty, including the costs, benefits and risks 
associated with a proposed intervention (Fenton and Neil 2018). This decision analysis approach is 
designed to provide insights even in data-limited environments by taking a causal approach, 
representing uncertainty and incorporating expert knowledge (Fenton and Neil 2018). Sensitivity 
analysis is used to help identify what further research or actions could help to enhance adoption and 
outcomes, and what variables should be closely monitored. In this case, the model was built in 
Microsoft Excel using freely available tools. To improve communication of the results to researchers 
and stakeholders, a simulation dashboard was provided that allows interactive simulation of the 
influence of key policy parameters on outcomes. 
 
Key steps in the simulation modeling approach and modeling results are reported in a separate report, 




The main limitation relates to fieldwork, which was planned for late March and early April 2020, but 
was not possible because of the global response to the Covid-19 pandemic resulting in a lockdown in 
India, social distancing and the virtual cessation of international flights. By August it became clear that 
travel would not return to normal in 2020, so the decision was made to hold virtual stakeholder 
validation workshops of the outcome trajectory history, specified theory of change and results from 
the scenario-building model. The evaluators took extra care to guard against bias through validating a 
timeline of key events and inferences with the majority of people interviewed before and during the 




main validation workshop. Sources of information are indicated in the report so as to establish an 
audit trail for the findings generated.  
FINDINGS 
The findings come from answering the EQs described in the Methodology section. 
 
EQ 1: How can the policy window theory be made more specific to the SPaRC 
outcome trajectory so as to help answer EQs 2, 3 and 4?? 
The SPaRC outcome trajectory theory of change is developed by identifying how the three immediate 
outcomes in the policy window theory are manifest in the SPaRC outcome trajectory described in 
Appendix 1, and what strategies the trajectory actors used to achieve them. The three immediate 
outcomes are: shifts in social norms; change in capacity; and strengthened support base. As in the 
policy window theory, the three immediate outcomes are together assumed to lead to improved 
policies, understood to be the inclusion of SPaRC in government initiatives to solarize irrigation in 
India.  
EQ 1.1 How does the ‘shift in social norms’ outcome manifest itself in the outcome trajectory 
and what strategies did trajectory actors use? 
Finding 1: The history of the SPaRC outcome trajectory (Appendix 1) shows that it was born out of 
the broader solar irrigation policy trajectory that in turn was born out of the longer-established 
groundwater irrigation trajectory (see Figure 2). In this initial trajectory, the social norm became 
that farmers in the drier parts of India have a right to free or very cheap electricity for pumping 
water for irrigation. Groundwater irrigation became seen as the backbone of the Green Revolution 
in northwest India, but also became a major problem. The solar irrigation trajectory began partly in 
response to groundwater irrigation contributing significantly to India’s GHG emissions, as well as to 
ease the subsidy burden of providing very cheap electricity on electricity distribution companies 
(DISCOMs) and the Indian government. In turn, the SPaRC trajectory arose in response to the 
concern that widespread adoption of solar irrigation would exacerbate groundwater depletion. 
 
The SPaRC timeline (Appendix 1) shows the outcome trajectory beginning in the 1950s and 1960s with 
a steady increase in mechanized pumping. In 1969, the Government of India established the Rural 
Electrification Corporation, which contributed to a rapid increase in the number of wells and pumps 
as the backbone of the Green Revolution in western India.4 In the 1970s, politicians began to woo 
farmers with the promise of free electricity, with Tamil Nadu being the first state to provide it in the 
1980s. This was in part to respond to the problem that farmers reliant on groundwater for irrigating 
their crops had to pay much more for water than their counterparts who could benefit from 
government-subsidized surface irrigation. Provision of very cheap electricity led to a rapid increase in 
the number of privately-purchased mechanized pumps from 5,000 in 1951 to 19 million at the turn of 
the millennium and between 22 and 25 million in 2018. Pumps were credited with “normalizing the 
vast difference in access to irrigation between canal commands and dryland areas, between uplands 
and valleys, between large and small farmers, between areas underlain by alluvial and hard-rock 
aquifers” (Shah 2009). 
 
However, the success of groundwater pumping, and with it the rapid increase in grid-connected 
pumps, led to a growing awareness of two problems: impoverishment of DISCOMs supplying the very 
cheap electricity and the over-extraction of groundwater.  
 
                                                          
4 Respondent 13 




In 2000, Narendra Modi, the current Indian Prime Minister who was then Chief Minister of Gujarat, 
tried to tackle both problems by metering all pumps and charging for water consumed. The 
assumption was that farmers would pump less if they had to pay more for the water they consumed. 
However, the policy proved difficult to implement due to farmer protests. The norm that farmers had 
a right to very cheap electricity had become too well established.5 
 
In 2001, ITP, which was also formed in 2000, wrote a paper (Shah et al. 2003) pointing out the strength 
of the norm, specifically that every Chief Minister that had tried to increase the cost of rural power 
had encountered serious electoral setbacks. The lead author, Tushaar Shah, suggested rationing rural 
electricity as an admittedly second-best solution to metering, an idea that the World Bank had 
supported for Andhra Pradesh in 1997, but which had not been implemented. The proposal was that 
rural power would be rationed to a few hours a day by supplying it through separate feeders, so as to 
not affect domestic electricity supply. To offset expected farmer complaints, the intent was to increase 
the reliability of power supplied. Realizing the power of the agrarian vote, Narendra Modi dropped 
the metering idea and instead used irrigation as a political strategy, which included doing what ITP 
had suggested, as well as providing 500,000 new rural connections and supporting community efforts 
to recharge groundwater. He took personal credit for the 9% annual growth in agriculture in Gujarat 
in the 2000s and was subsequently re-elected three times.  
 
The third problem of mechanized pumps is their contribution to GHG emissions through their use of 
electricity from largely coal-fired power stations, or diesel. According to Dhillon et al. (2018), 6% 
of India’s total GHG emissions come from groundwater pumping. The attraction of solar irrigation for 
policy makers is that the power it uses is renewable, thus showing progress towards meeting state 
and national commitments to reduce GHG emissions. It also is electricity that does not need to be 
supplied by DISCOMs at a loss. In 2008, Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (GUVNL), the electrical 
services umbrella company operating in Gujarat, started working on solar pumping.6 
 
Any solution can bring its own problems. In 2009, Gujarat launched its Solar Power Policy as the first 
comprehensive solar policy in India, offering incentives to investors over a 25-year period. The 
following year, the Government of Rajasthan started subsidizing 87% of the cost of solar pumps. By 
2012, ITP had become concerned that the high capital subsidies offered by central and state 
governments would lead to rapid expansion of solar pump adoption. The rapidly falling cost of 
photovoltaics (PVs) also meant that it was only a matter of time before farmers would be able to afford 
solar pumps off-the-shelf, even without substantial government support. While this was desirable 
from the energy viewpoint and good for the parts of the country with a surplus of water, such a 
scenario could be potentially disastrous for water-deficient western and southern India where solar 
pumping could exacerbate groundwater depletion unless incentives were provided to prevent it. This 
led to the ITP team coming up with the idea of allowing farmers to sell the excess power they 
generated back to the grid, in a similar way as private companies were starting to do under the 
Gandhinagar PV Rooftop Program or the megawatt (MW)-scale solar power plants, both part of 
Gujarat’s Solar Power Policy.7 ITP’s hypothesis was that if the feed-in tariff offered to farmers was high 
enough, farmers would economize on water use so as to have excess power to sell. In 2012, Tushaar 
Shah and Avinash Kishore wrote an ITP Water Policy Research Highlight in which they proposed the 
idea (Shah and Kishore 2012). The idea of Solar Power as a Remunerative Crop (SPaRC) was born.  
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Figure 2. The concept of nested outcome trajectories that influence each other. 
 
Finding 2: From its birth in 2012, SPaRC trajectory actors have been very successful in embedding 
the concept of SPaRC in two government programs: as the basis for Gujarat’s SKY scheme and then 
as one of three components in the national PM-KUSUM initiative, which has a budget of USD 50 
billion. SPaRC’s policy successes are in part due to framing the model as being able to deliver on five 
politically important issues. ITP had particular success with the message that SPaRC offers a triple 
win for farmers, the state and water resources. The framings clearly resonated with policy makers. 
 
The history of the SPaRC outcome trajectory shows that conceptually the idea proved compelling to 
fellow researchers and politicians in particular because it offered to solve the following problems 
(listed in order of political importance): 
 Low and uncertain farm income by allowing farmers to effectively grow another, profitable 
crop and build climate resilience; 
 The liability of DISCOMs to supply very cheap electricity by allowing farmers to produce their 
own; 
 The unreliability of the power supplied through tubewell feeders, and providing it always 
during daylight hours; 
 Groundwater depletion by assuming that farmers would choose to pump less so as to earn 
more by selling power back to the grid; 
 GHG emissions by replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy. 
 
ITP found particular resonance with the message that solar crops offer a triple win for farmers, the 
state and precious water reserves. As one respondent said, capturing a sentiment of most of those 
interviewed, “SPaRC is a brilliant idea.”8 
 
In June 2018, the Government of Gujarat launched the SKY scheme. Under the scheme, 80 out of 
Gujarat’s 7,000 agricultural feeders are to be solarized, covering an expected 12,400 farms in 33 
districts.9 The SKY scheme was based on SPaRC’s signature idea of connecting farmers to the grid and 
incentivizing them to pump less groundwater by paying them for excess power generated.10 Panels 
are connected to the grid in a similar way to Gujarat’s pre-existing Gandhinagar PV Rooftop Program. 
Given the timing and nature of the SKY scheme, it is highly likely that ITP contributed to the 
formulation of SKY. 
 
SPaRC also became one of three components of KUSUM (i.e., KUSUM-C; see EQ 2.1 for description of 
other KUSUM components) with a total intended budget of USD 50 billion. KUSUM-C has a target of 
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installing 1 million grid-connected solar pumps able to sell back to the grid. KUSUM guidelines were 
published in July 2019.  
 
Two potential benefits of SPaRC were highlighted in a World Bank publication on the Rajasthan water-
food-energy nexus published in January 2020 (World Bank 2020). They are: 
 Allowing marginal farmers to survive droughts without depending on handouts; 
 Improving feeder governance. 
Two ITP staff contributed to the report. 
 
The drought argument is that income from selling power back to the grid would allow farmers to 
irrigate enough land to feed their livestock, thus allowing them to survive droughts without the 
indignity of seeking government handouts. Farmers could be offered a higher feed-in tariff during 
droughts to compensate for a fall in the production of hydropower.11 The improved governance 
expectation is that farmers will become more proactive in ensuring better governance of their feeders 
once they start selling power back to the grid.  
 
Finding 3: ITP has been successful in building support for SPaRC by:  
 Presenting the model to key decision makers in a number of very high-level meetings;  
 Setting up successful pilots showing SPaRC could work in practice;  
 Publishing articles in the Economic and Policy Weekly and national newspapers, including 
the Hindu, the Times of India and the Business Post.  
Support was built before results from the SPaRC pilots had been fully analyzed. 
 
As the timeline shows, ITP began successfully advocating for SPaRC in 2012. ITP staff, in particular 
Tushaar Shah, had very good links and relationships with key decision makers, based on more than 10 
years of providing useful policy advice, not least to separate rural feeders and ration rural power to 8 
hours a day.  
 
In 2013, Tushaar Shah met with the Principal Secretary of the Gujarat Energy Department who asked 
if ITP could implement SPaRC on the ground. At about the same time, CCAFS proposed a pilot project 
to do the same. ITP agreed to act on both opportunities,12 beginning with a proof-of-concept trial  
working with one banana farmer in Thamna village in 2014. ITP paid the farmer for the power he fed 
back into the grid because, at this point, DISCOMs still needed to be convinced of the technical 
feasibility of the SPaRC model, including concerns over grid safety.13 In 2016, a larger proof-of-concept 
trial began in Dhundi, involving six farmers who had previously used diesel engines to power their 
pumps. The aim of this trial was to validate the prediction that SPaRC would result in farmers 
increasing their income while pumping less water. The expectation that farmers would be prepared 
to give up their right to cheap electricity from the grid was validated in a third trial led by the National 
Dairy Development Board (NDDB) that began in 2018. 
 
In June 2014 and January 2015, ITP, represented by Tushaar Shah, presented the idea of SPaRC to the 
Finance Minister of the Government of India as part of a consultation process to develop the annual 
budget.14 In promoting SPaRC, ITP used the strategy of inviting people to visit the trials, including 
receptive politicians and the media, writing articles (see Table 1) and promoting the novelty of the 
work. For example, the Business Standard published an article on July 13, 2015, after ITP paid the 
banana farmer in Thamna village for the electricity he supplied back to the grid. The article allowed 
ITP to put across its message, quoting Tushaar Shah as saying:  
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“Solar irrigation pumps provide farmers water to irrigate their fields and also gives them an 
incentive to sell their remaining power to the grid. Solar power can be a steady source of 
income for farmers. This will also address the issue of groundwater depletion. The buyback 
scheme could also protect farm incomes in the event of crop failure. And, if adopted widely, 
this could help ease pressure on the state’s overburdened electricity board. Solar crops are a 
very exciting example of a ‘triple’ win — for farmers, the state, and the precious water 
reserves, all benefit from a single intervention” (Cherian 2015). 
  
On May 9, 2016, the Chief Minister of Gujarat recognized the Dhundi pilot project 15 as an innovative 
initiative for providing climate-smart benefits to its members and the following day the farmers 
involved were commissioned as the world’s first Solar Pump Irrigators’ Cooperative Enterprise (SPICE). 
About 500 visitors came to the site over the next six months, and within a year, an online article 
appeared on IndiaSpend (Patel 2017) about Dhundi being the first solar irrigation cooperative, and 
having a solution to India’s groundwater crisis. This was picked up by the Economic Times of India16 
and Bloomberg India.17 The original article included a 14-minute video on Dhundi.  
 
NDDB also publicized the success of the Mujkuva village cooperative in Gujarat which it helped set up 
with 11 farmers who agreed to relinquish their right to cheap electricity from the grid. Their 
cooperative was inaugurated by the Indian Prime Minster Narendra Modi in September 2018.18 The 
inauguration was covered in articles in the Hindu Business Line19 and the Times of India20 among other 
online publishers. The Times of India’s headline was “Anklav farmers forgo subsidized electricity, 
operation for solar power.” According to one respondent, the initial conceptualization of the 
cooperative went through many design iterations so as to best accommodate the needs and 
requirements of farmers and the DISCOMs.21 
 
A main part of ITP’s policy-influencing strategy was to publish (see Table 1). The strategy was to 
prioritize publications read by the decision makers ITP was trying to influence, over and above 
academic high-impact journals that they did not read. ITP learned that the journal Economic and 
Political Weekly had the greatest reach and the editor would publish articles quickly if he thought the 
paper was interesting.22 ITP published four articles in this journal between 2014 and 2019, as well as 
two in the Financial Express and one in the peer-reviewed journal Environmental Research Letters.23 
Other publications included a chapter making the case for SPaRC in a book targeting the new 
government in Delhi in 2014, with a Foreword written by Ratan N. Tata, Chairman of Tata Trusts. ITP 
adopted the International Water Management Institute’s (IWMI’s) strategy of writing relatively short 
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research highlights explaining policy implications, backed up by a longer research report. ITP published 
two highlights on SPaRC.  
 
ITP also produced a professionally made video in January 2016 called “SPaRC’ing a Revolution,”24 
which one respondent said was useful because it could be shown to ministers and other high-level 
decision makers as visual evidence of farmers benefiting from SPaRC.  
 
The decisions to include SPaRC in SKY and KUSUM-C were made and acted upon before the proof-of-
concept trials had been completed and their results fully socialized and debated. This is in accordance 
with the policy window theory that says policy change can happen even if the policy solution is not 
fully formed or tested, if the problem has broad support and the politics around the issue carry weight. 
ITP released promising figures that were published by the Times of India on the basis of projected 
results from the pilots, e.g., that through SPaRC a farmer could earn USD 870 in a year, more than half 
the average annual farm income of just USD 1,440. ITP also said that 10 million solar farmers could 
adopt SPaRC and ‘grow’ 130 billion units of solar power, earning up to INR 65,000 crore (USD 8.7 
billion) per year net of input costs.25 
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Table 1. ITP authored publications in support of SPaRC in India. 
Year Authors Title Type of publication 
2012 Shah, Kishore Solar-powered pump irrigation and India’s 
groundwater economy: a preliminary 
discussion of opportunities and threats 
IWMI-Tata Water 
Research Highlight 
2014 Shah, Verma Addressing water management Chapter in the book 
Getting India back on 
track 
2014 Shah, Durga Karnataka’s smart, new solar pump policy for 
irrigation 
Article – Economic and 
Political Weekly 
2015 Shah, Durga, 
Verma 
Harvesting solar riches Article – Financial 
Express 
2016 Shah, Durga, 
Jani, Magal 
A new Anand cooperative model – this time, 
in solar farming.  
Article – Financial 
Express 
2016 Shah, Durga, 
Verma, Rathod 
Solar power as remunerative crop IWMI-Tata Water 
Research Highlight 
2016 Durga, Rathod Paving the way for an orange revolution in 
India 
Article – Energy Next 
2017 Shah, Durga, 
Rai, Verma, 
Rathod 
Promoting solar power as a remunerative 
crop 
Article – Economic and 
Political Weekly 
2018 Shah Kick-starting the Kisan Urja Suraksha evam 
Utthaan Mahabhiyan 
Article – Economic and 
Political Weekly 
2018 Shah, Rajan, 
Rai, Verma, 
Durga 
Solar pumps and South Asia’s energy-
groundwater nexus: exploring implications 
and reimagining its future 
Article – Environmental 
Research Letters journal 
2018 Shah Kick starting KUSUM (Kisan Urja Suraksha 
evam Utthaan Mahaabhiyam) 
IWMI-Tata Water 
Research Highlight 
2018 Shah, Durga, 
Verma, Rai, 
Rathod 
The promise of Dhundi solar pump irrigators’ 
cooperative 
IWMI-Tata Water Policy 
Research Brochure 
2019 Verma, Durga, 
Shah 
Solar irrigation pumps and India’s energy–
irrigation nexus 
Article – Economic and 
Political Weekly 
 
Finding 4: A number of questions relating to the supposed benefits of SPaRC require further 
research, such as under what conditions will farmers willingly agree to give up their grid 
connections; whether DISCOMs will cooperate in establishing what will effectively be a competing 
distributed power generation network; and whether farmers do pump less groundwater overall if 
they can sell power back to the grid.  
 
The fact that these questions still need to be answered might suggest that SPaRC is not yet ready to 
go to scale. One respondent26 said he thought there were so many moving parts that it was 
impossible to know how KUSUM will play out, so the only option would be to start and then adapt 
quickly to how farmers, DISCOMs and other key stakeholders responded. A hope is that simulation 
modeling being carried out as part of this evaluation can help manage some of the uncertainty. 
Answers to the Solar Irrigation for Agricultural Resilience in South Asia (SoLAR-SA) project’s key 
research questions will also be important. 
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As well as advocating for SPaRC, SPaRC trajectory actors have been active in answering some key 
research questions implied by the claims made about the benefits of SPaRC. In 2019, the Swiss Agency 
for Development and Cooperation (SDC) began funding the SoLAR-SA project,27 which seeks to answer 
two key questions:  
1. To what extent do farmers pump less water if they can sell power back to the grid? 
2. How much water does one unit of electrical power pump for different depths of the water 
table and different hydroecologies? 
The answers will help solar irrigation programs understand how best to incentivize farmers to pump 
less water.28 Other research questions include: 
 To what extent does the establishment of cooperatives help or hinder farmers in succeeding 
with SPaRC? 
 If farmers start selling surplus power to the grid will they stop supplying marginalized 
neighbors with water? 
 Will DISCOMs cooperate in what will effectively be the setting up of a competing supplier of 
electricity? 
 What is the relationship between the feed-in rate paid and whether farmers choose to sell 
power back to the grid? 
 
Also, in August 2019, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), IWMI and 
CCAFS began the first phase of an ongoing partnership to understand the success factors and barriers 
to large-scale adoption of solar irrigation pumps (SIPs). A key output will be a compendium of case 
studies of different technical, financial and institutional models of SIP promotion.  
EQ 1.2 How does the ‘change in capacity’ outcome manifest itself in the outcome trajectory 
and what strategies did trajectory actors use?  
Finding 5: A number of different types of capacity were needed for SPaRC trajectory actors to 
contribute to SPaRC becoming the basis of SKY and a core part of KUSUM. The capacities required 
were: 
 A well-framed and compelling solution to a number of priority issues; 
 A sufficiently strong track record and reputation to be invited to present to government and 
state secretaries and ministers and other high-level decision makers; 
 The ability to take advantage of these policy windows by making well-framed and 
persuasive presentations; 
 The foresight and flexibility to establish successful pilots that convinced key decision makers 
that SPaRC was practical, as well as conceptually promising; 
 The capacity to respond to much greater than expected media interest in the pilots; 
 The ability to write, and the contacts to have published, articles in national newspapers that 
helped pique and direct the interest of the broader print and TV media. 
  
The capacities match well with the policy window theory. Improvements in capacity were generally 
self-taught rather than produced through formal training. The one capacity that the theory does not 
foreshadow strongly is the capacity to be flexible and adapt to opportunities other than policy 
windows. In this sense, ITP was fortunate in its membership of CCAFS, which provided the funding 
for the Dhundi pilot. A well-recognized strength of CCAFS, WLE and CRPs in general is their quick 
and straightforward provision of relatively small grants for innovative yet sometimes risky ideas. 
 
As described in Figure 3, the story of how ITP and other key trajectory actors were able to change 
thinking and opinion to help bring about the inclusion of SPaRC in KUSUM is also a story of the 
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deployment of substantial capacity by these actors. ITP likely first influenced policy thinking at a 
ministerial level when Tushaar Shah made a presentation in January 2013 to the Minister of Finance, 
Palaniappan Chidambaram. Tushaar Shah knew how to prepare for such an opportunity, having been 
invited to present at similar annual budget consultations in the past. He knew to present a fundable 
proposal in less than 5 minutes. The proposal was for a fund to promote solar pumping, which enabled 
ITP to put forward the idea that solar pumping could address several priority policy issues at the same 
time. While the proposal was not funded in 2013, the claim is that the presentation resonated with 
the minister and helped embed the idea that the Government of India should support solar pumping.29  
 
The following year, Tushaar Shah was invited to present SPaRC to the new Minister of Finance, Arun 
Jaitley and the Minister of Commerce, Nirmala Sitharaman at the finance minister’s office in New 
Delhi. Both ministers talked to Shah after the meeting and said they would put money into the Union 
Budget. The budget, when it came out a few weeks later, included an allocation of USD 67 million for 
solar pump promotion. Although no specific mention of SPaRC was made, prior intent makes it 
plausible that the ITP presentation was influential.  
 
It is also plausible that ITP ideas influenced the Surya Raitha solar irrigation policy, launched a few 
months later by the Government of Karnataka. The policy adopted the SPaRC signature idea of paying 
farmers a high feed-in tariff as an incentive to pump less groundwater, although SPaRC was not 
mentioned. 
 
ITP continued to be invited to make high-level presentations. In 2015, Tushaar Shah presented to the: 
 Minister of Finance as part of the consultation process for developing the annual budget; 
 World Bank in New Delhi;  
 Development Support Center (DSC) public lecture in Ahmedabad;  
 World Energy Council, New Delhi;  
 Innovative Thought Forum, New Delhi;  
 Power Secretary, Government of Gujarat;  
 Power Secretary, Government of Maharashtra. 
 
According to one respondent, a game-changer was the setting up of the three pilots showing that 
farmers could successfully sell power back to the grid (see Finding 3). The demonstrations appear to 
have reassured observers that the promise of SPaRC could be realized in practice. The demonstrations 
generated an unexpectedly large amount of interest, with visits from the press, television, hundreds 
of farmers from Gujarat and other states, and politicians, including a visit from Gujarat’s energy 
minister in May 2018. 
 
The capacity employed by the SPaRC trajectory actors, in particular ITP, was multifaceted. As the 
trajectory timeline shows, ITP did not set out in 2012 with a clear plan as to how to persuade the 
governments of Gujarat and India to fund large programs based on SPaRC. ITP did not develop an 
advocacy strategy. Indeed, ITP and other trajectory actors see themselves as suggesting policy 
hypotheses to decision makers rather than advocating – a term associated in India with campaigning 
organizations. 
 
The capacity that ITP had was largely inherent and functional: inherent in the sense that it had been 
built up in the 12 years prior to 2012; and functional in the sense that that ITP had the capacity to 
respond to policy windows and opportunities to communicate as they emerged. 
 
ITP’s inherent capacity stemmed in part from having developed a reputation for generating useful and 
innovative ideas. For example, in the early 2000s, Tushaar Shah and colleagues argued in an IWMI 
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Research Report for a compromise option to solve the problem of the overuse of near-free electricity 
by farmers to pump water (Shah et al. 2003). They proposed that, rather than charge metered tariffs, 
as commonly suggested at the time, feeders supplying power to tubewells should be separated from 
other rural feeders and intelligent rationing should be employed for tubewells. During 2001-02, this 
proposal was presented in several workshops and conferences in Gujarat and other states. In Gujarat, 
the proposal was shared with the state Minister of Power, the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Authority 
and the chairman of the Gujarat Electricity Board. In September 2003, the Government of Gujarat 
launched the Jyotirgram Yojana scheme to install separate feeders to 90% of Gujarat’s 18,000 
villages.30 Most of the work was carried out in 1,000 days between 2006 and 2008. Other states 
followed suit. 
 
ITP’s reputation for generating useful and innovative ideas contributed to Tushaar Shah becoming one 
of 20 or so agricultural experts invited to present on a regular basis to the Minister of Finance’s annual 
consultation on the Union Budget. This provided the opportunity for ITP to first present SPaRC at 
ministerial level. Other invitees included the Director of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research. 
 
ITP backed up its ideas and ‘policy hypotheses’ with approachable, well-written policy briefs in 
addition to newspaper articles. ITP’s objective is to help policy makers at the central, state and local 
levels address their water challenges by translating research findings into practical policy 
recommendations. One of the contributions of the Tata Trusts in the equal partnership with IWMI is 
to bring a very practical and use-oriented perspective. ITP has published more than 13 publications 
that explain and make the case for SPaRC (see Table 1). 
 
ITP’s ability to take advantage of policy windows and opportunities to communicate about SPaRC has 
also been important. As the trajectory history shows, ITP was able to secure a series of invitations for 
what turned out to be highly influential presentations to ministers and secretaries of power, energy, 
finance and commerce at state and national levels, as well as to other prominent organizations such 
as the World Bank. The key ability was to be able to present SPaRC as a solution to a number of priority 
concerns of the audience, in ways that were compelling within the time available. It appears this was 
a self-taught skill rather than one in which presenters had been trained. 
 
A raft of opportunities to communicate about SPaRC largely flowed from ITP’s decision to set up 
demonstrations of SPaRC working in practice. ITP, through its partnership with CCAFS, was able to 
secure USD 200,000 in May 2015 for the “promotion of climate-smart agriculture through solar pump 
irrigation cooperative in Gujarat.” ITP originally expected to find farmers who would give up their right 
to a grid connection in return for becoming part of a cooperative and receiving a subsidy for the capital 
cost of the equipment from the Madhya Gujarat Vij Company Limited (MGVCL) under the Government 
of Gujarat’s solar pump scheme. In practice, ITP found that farmers were unwilling to give up their 
connections; instead, it switched to working with farmers in Dhundi village who had no right to a grid 
connection and were using expensive-to-run diesel-powered pumps. CCAFS was flexible enough to 
allow this change. Without this capacity to be flexible and run a convincing pilot, the Dhundi 
cooperative would not have been established, and the communication opportunities that followed (as 
already described) would not have arisen. Initial interest from print and TV journalists generated 
output that stimulated further interest. ITP was able to influence the stories that came out by 
authoring its own newspaper articles on SPaRC, e.g., “Harvesting solar riches” in the Financial Express 
on April 1, 201531 and “A new Anand cooperative model – this time, in solar farming” in the Indian 
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Express on May 19, 2016.32 ITP also released a Water Policy Research Highlight on SPaRC in 2016 to 
provide more detailed background information (Shah et al. 2016).  
 
Finding 6: Supporting farmers to form solar cooperatives is thought to be an important part of the 
SPaRC model, for which capacity will not fully exist once KUSUM-C begins full-scale implementation. 
NDDB plans to support solar cooperative formation among its members, but this by itself will not 
be sufficient. The preference that farmers form solar cooperatives could be written into KUSUM-C 
guidelines so as to exert additional leverage for support to cooperative formation. 
 
An important part of making the SPaRC model work is that farmers form solar cooperatives with a 
single connection to the feeder to reduce the number of meter readings and payments made by the 
DISCOM to manageable levels. Another advantage of cooperative membership is shared responsibility 
and collective action to maintain the microgrid that connects individual farmers to the feeder as well 
as to provide additional leverage when requesting the DISCOM to maintain and fix the feeder itself. 
Farmers require time and support to set up and successfully run cooperatives. Several respondents 
voiced concern that this capacity will be lacking once states start installing 1 million grid-connected 
pumps for 1 million farmers. NDDB has indicated its intention to support the establishment of solar 
cooperatives among its members but this will not be sufficient. Also, respondents point out that the 
preference to provide grid-connected pumps to cooperatives is not yet made explicit in the KUSUM-C 
guidance material and should be.  
 
Finding 7: Early indications are that among farmers who have adopted SPaRC, those who 
understand how it works pump less water and export more power to the grid. Supporting farmers 
to form solar cooperatives at feeder level helps build this understanding. There is a view that 
politicians need to be more forceful in putting across the message to farmers that unless efforts are 
made to save groundwater now there will be severe shortages in the future.  
Research carried out by the Gujarat Energy Research and Management Institute (GERMI) is showing 
that while some of the solarized farmers in the SKY scheme are reducing the amount of water they 
are pumping, many are not.33 For these farmers, it is proving more attractive to irrigate more or sell 
more water to neighbors than sell power back to the grid. This is in part because they do not 
necessarily trust that they will be paid by the DISCOM for their evacuated  power, nor do they know 
how much they could be earning. Some are also not clear that they first need to pay off the loan they 
received towards the cost of the solarized system before they earn any money themselves, and if they 
do not pay back the loan in full, they will need to make up the shortfall in cash. This understanding is 
better in the 10 feeders on which ITP and GERMI worked as part of the SDC SPICE project, and as a 
result, more farmers in these feeders are pumping less water and earning more from the sale of 
exported power. 
 
One respondent34 expressed the view that politicians should be more strongly promoting the message 
that farmers need to save groundwater now or there will severe shortages in the future. He said that 
the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) should be communicating this, but MNRE did not 
have the resources to do so by itself.  
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EQ 1.3: How does the ‘strengthened support base’ outcome manifest itself in the SPaRC 
outcome trajectory and what strategies did trajectory actors use? 
Finding 8: The SPaRC outcome trajectory would not have made the progress it has without support 
from: 
 WLE and Tata Trusts – for the proof-of-concept single-farmer SPaRC pilot in Thamna; 
 CCAFS and Tata Trusts– providing timely and flexible funding to the Dhundi pilot; 
 SDC –  for providing additional support for solar cooperative formation as part of SKY and 
then SoLAR beyond India; 
 GIZ – for tools and case studies for solar irrigation promotion at scale. 
 
Crucial to the success of the SPaRC policy outcome trajectory to date has been the resources available 
to the trajectory actors. As discussed under Finding 3, the pilots that showed farmers earning money 
from SPaRC by selling power back to the grid proved pivotal in winning over high-level champions of 
SPaRC. Champions included Sujit Gulati, Gujarat’s Energy Secretary who visited Dhundi in 2018.  
 
As the timeline shows, the first pilot began in 2015 with a single banana farmer in Thamna village in 
Gujarat, with funding from IWMI/WLE and Tata Trusts. Also in 2015, CCAFS provided a USD 200,000 
grant for “promotion of climate-smart agriculture through solar pump irrigation cooperative in 
Gujarat” that allowed ITP to establish the Dhundi pilot the following year. In 2018, IWMI/WLE provided 
support to NDDB and Rajasthan Electronics and Instruments Limited (REIL) to establish a third pilot – 
the Majkuva Village Solar Cooperative. 
 
Building on the success of the Dhundi pilot, SDC approved an ITP proposal for the “Solar Pump 
Irrigators’ Cooperative Enterprise (SPICE) with Grid-Connected Farmers in Gujarat.” The project 
supported the formation of about 10 solar cooperatives on SKY feeders. The project laid the 
foundation for the SoLAR partnership between SDC, ITP and GERMI.35 
 
SDC supported the SoLAR-SA project, which began work in 2019 in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and 
Pakistan, with GERMI as a partner in India and a budget of USD 5.4 million. As discussed under Finding 
4, the objective of SoLAR-SA is to answer research questions to help solar irrigation programs, such as 
SKY and KUSUM, understand how best to incentivize farmers to pump less water. All four countries 
included in the project are working on grid-connected solar pumps, i.e., on SPaRC. At the same time, 
GIZ funded the “Solar Irrigation Expansion in India Partnership” to develop tools and case studies for 
solar irrigation promotion at scale. 
 
Finding 9: The SPaRC outcome trajectory has gained momentum by trajectory actors showing the 
model’s relevance to four priority policy processes, in order of importance: 
 To provide farmers with a reliable electricity supply during the day, while at the same time 
reducing the burden to DISCOMs of providing heavily subsidized power, a policy pursued by 
the Ministry of Power and the MNRE; 
 A commitment to double farmer income between 2016 and 2022 made by Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi; 
 A plan by the Government of India to install 100 gigawatts (GW) of solar capacity by 2022 –  
a fivefold increase on its original target of 20 GW; 
 The need to reduce groundwater depletion in the dry west and south of the country.  
 
The ability to harness a policy trajectory to other, bigger trajectories, is a key capacity flagged by 
the policy window theory. Reputation is also flagged and perhaps more than anything else, what 
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SPaRC has had in its favor is that ITP’s leader – Tushaar Shah – was known for his policy advice by 
Narendra Modi while he was Chief Minister of Gujarat from 2001 to 2014. There is also some 
evidence of a coalition of trajectory actors in support of SPaRC, something that is identified in the 
literature as important in bringing about and implementing policy change. The coalition engages to 
some extent in ‘impact tracking,’ identified as a set of behaviors important to achieving impact in 
another evaluation of WLE outcomes. 
 
Several policy processes have supported and are supporting the SPaRC policy outcome trajectory. The 
timeline shows that the first was the policy process pursued by the Ministry of Power and the MNRE 
to provide farmers with a reliable electricity supply during the day, while at the same time reducing 
the burden to DISCOMs of providing heavily subsidized power, and the resulting need for the 
government to regularly bail them out. An added attraction of this trajectory is that it gives a greater 
role to farmers and their organizations in the governance of rural feeders, with the promise of 
reducing losses.  
 
The second trajectory has resulted from the call by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2016 to double 
farmer income by 2022.36 This paved the way for a number of large government programs, in 
particular the launch of Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana (PMKSY; Prime Ministers’ Irrigation 
Development Program) with a commitment to invest USD 6.7 billion over 5 years in universalizing 
irrigation access, as well as SKY and KUSUM.  
 
A third trajectory stems from India’s global commitment to reduce its GHG emissions and the pressure 
the national government has been putting on state governments to increase the amount of electricity 
generated from renewable resources, notably wind and solar. The Government of India is currently 
upgrading its target from 20 GW to 100 GW of solar generating capacity by 2022.37 
 
A fourth policy trajectory relates to the need to reduce groundwater depletion. To date, the push for 
solar irrigation has come largely from the energy and power sectors.38 ITP sees itself as having an 
important role in continuing to flag the importance of finding solutions that solve the power supply 
problem without exacerbating groundwater depletion while doubling farmers’ incomes – in other 
words to tackle the energy-water-agriculture nexus.39 Nevertheless, the sense from participants in the 
validation workshop was that this trajectory, while becoming more important, is still not the main 
policy driver.  
 
Some of the interviewees were clearly motivated by a common belief that SPaRC could finally tackle 
the energy-water-agriculture nexus. They also talked about others, including state secretaries (see 
Finding 8), sharing the vision and becoming champions of SPaRC. This may amount to a ‘coalition,’  
something that is identified as important in policy change and defined as a network of stakeholders 
who coalesce around a broad, shared agenda, who also bring resources.40 The SPaRC coalition also 
shares a view that widespread adoption of KUSUM-A will exacerbate the nexus. 
 
Several respondents suggested that more than anything else, what the SPaRC coalition has in its favor 
is that the leader of ITP – Tushaar Shah – was known and respected by Narendra Modi while he was 
Chief Minister of Gujarat, before he became Prime Minister of India (see Finding 5).  
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The concept of a coalition in policy change theory is similar to ‘impact tracking,’ which was identified 
as a key ingredient of success in another outcome evaluation of WLE research (Douthwaite and Genet 
2020). Impact tracking involves senior nationally based researchers using their professional networks 
to establish and move an outcome trajectory forward, using a set of behaviors akin to ‘product 
championing,’ including overcoming obstacles and taking advantage of policy windows. A common 
component in both is champions who have good access to policy makers.  
 
 
Finding 10: In 2020, the World Bank and the Reserve Bank of India helped create an enabling 
environment for the adoption and scaling of SPaRC. In December 2020, the World Bank and MNRE 
were discussing potential support for the KUSUM scheme, including KUSUM-C. The Reserve Bank of 
India is revising priority sector lending guidelines to support environment-friendly lending policies 
and placing a stronger focus on group lending to farmer organizations. 
In 2020, there have been a number of bank-led developments with the potential to support farmer 
adoption under KUSUM-C. In December, a respondent41 reported that the World Bank was discussing 
the provision of a large loan to support KUSUM to be administered through MNRE. A World Bank 
publication on the energy-water-agriculture nexus in Rajasthan published in January 2020 came out 
strongly in favor of KUSUM-C (i.e., SPaRC) and against KUSUM-A in water-deficit states (World Bank 
2020). 
 
In September 2020, the Reserve Bank of India issued revised priority sector lending guidelines to 
encourage and support environment-friendly lending policies to help achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals. Indications are that lending for solar water pumps would be included under the 
guidelines. There is also a stronger focus on group-based lending to farmers’ cooperatives, farmers’ 
producer companies and self-help groups and joint liability groups. This policy change may encourage 
organized groups to avail themselves of affordable finance for engaging in forms of collective 
production and use of energy, such as KUSUM-C.42 
 
Finding 11: KUSUM-C faces some competition. A strong political push to solarize irrigation by the 
Government of India is, somewhat surprisingly, threatening the enabling environment for SPaRC 
described in Findings 9 and 10. In Gujarat, the state that has been the leading supporter of SPaRC, 
the state government has realized that SPaRC is a more complex intervention than KUSUM-A 
because it requires farmers to form solar cooperatives while KUSUM-A requires no farmer 
involvement at all. At the same time, MNRE and others are exploring off-grid installations in which 
farmers sell excess power for local uses other than pumping water, so as to sidestep possibly 
uncooperative DISCOMs. 
Some participants in the validation workshop were of the opinion that improving farmers’ electricity 
supply remains a main driver of the large push to solarize irrigation in India. This, they suggested, is 
evident in the October 2020 commitment by the Government of Gujarat to provide all tubewells with 
reliable, 100% daytime power within one year.43 Other states, apparently, are considering similar 
announcements. Participants thought that this could not be achieved without rapid installation of 
additional solar generating capacity, and confirmed that KUSUM would be used to do so in Gujarat. If 
so, this will give a massive boost to KUSUM-A compared to KUSUM-C, because the former is much 
simpler and quicker to implement: KUSUM-A can be implemented without involving farmers or 
helping them form solar cooperatives through which to connect to the grid. The Government of 
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Gujarat had previously said that it would not consider KUSUM-A; however, a participant44 said that 
the government was taking a much more circumspect attitude with KUSUM-C compared to SKY, 
because of the complexities it encountered in making SKY work properly (see Finding 14). 
 
Respondents interviewed suggested that MNRE is also somewhat reticent towards KUSUM-C because 
of the costs it envisages to strengthen rural grids. MNRE has run a program since 201045 to install off-
grid solar generating capacity in areas where grid power is either unavailable or unreliable. In such 
settings, MNRE encourages connecting together a number of farmers to create a microgrid to supply 
power for other purposes, such as refrigeration or drinking water purification. MNRE is considering 
providing a universal controller to allow farmers to use the power they generate for local purposes 
other than pumping water. 
 
Finding 12: There is some degree of optimism that community-based organizations (CBOs) and not-
for-profit organizations (NGOs) can help facilitate the formation of the approximately 20,000 farmer 
organizations needed to connect the 1 million farmers targeted by KUSUM-C. This would be made 
easier by the existence of a quasi-governmental organization providing a framework into which 
CBOs and NGOs could contribute. Winning the support of DISCOMs may also be possible given the 
considerable political backing for power sector reform and that the idea of the energy-water-
agriculture nexus has gained traction. 
 
One respondent likened SPaRC to Participatory Irrigation Management.46 Both require forming farmer 
organizations through committed and competent facilitating agencies – NGOs and CBOs – that are 
sometimes difficult to find. Secondly, both are dependent on the service provider – DISCOMs and 
water resources departments, respectively – that often perceive a threat to their existence and 
become a bottleneck to scaling up.  
 
Assuming 50 farmers per cooperative, it would require 20,000 cooperatives to connect the 1 million 
farmers targeted by KUSUM-C. Participants gave some grounds for optimism for mobilizing NGOs and 
CBOs to become effective facilitation agencies at a large enough scale. The facilitation role is well 
within the remit of many NGOs and CBOs, which have become more used to meeting with each other 
as a result of Covid lockdowns and the need for remote working. Nevertheless, the approach 
suggested by one respondent would be for a quasi-government body to provide the framework to 
which NGOs and CBOs could contribute.47  
 
One respondent was hopeful that winning the support of DISCOMs may be possible given the 
considerable political backing for power sector reform and that the idea of the energy-water-
agriculture nexus has gained traction.  
EQ 1.4: Based on the answers above, what is the SPaRC outcome trajectory theory of 
change?  
Finding 13: Like the policy window theory, the SPaRC outcome trajectory theory of change is based 
on strategies that contribute to three immediate outcomes:  
 A shift in social norms manifest as increased shared agreement that widespread adoption 
of SPaRC will contribute to several priority issues; 
 A change in capacity manifest as the continued capacity of trajectory actors to: 1) embed 
SPaRC in existing policy processes; and 2) support the establishment of solar cooperatives 
needed for SPaRC to work well; 
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 A strengthened support base manifest as increased funding to carry out SPaRC pilots 
together with strengthening the institutions required for SPaRC to work well.  
The main mechanistic difference in the theory of change compared to the more generic policy 
window theory is to recognize that the three immediate outcomes are linked to each other in a self-
reinforcing loop that drives the outcome trajectory. The specific strategies used to achieve the 
immediate outcomes are shown in theory of change diagram (Figure 3) and further detailed in Table 
2.  
 The evaluation team presented the findings from EQ 1.1 to 1.3 in a validation workshop to key 
individuals involved in or very knowledgeable of the outcome trajectory.48 The team used the findings, 
and the feedback on them, to identify and describe the strategies used by SPaRC trajectory actors to 
contribute to the three immediate outcomes – ‘shift in social norms,’ ‘change in capacity’ and 
‘strengthened support base.’  
 
The main adaptation to the policy window theory is to show the three immediate outcomes in a self-
reinforcing feedback loop, linked to each other as described in a list of causal assumptions (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. SPaRC outcome trajectory theory of change, based on policy window theory.  
 
 
The causal assumptions underpinning the theory of change are indicated by letters in Figure 3 and are 
as follows: 
 
a) The capacity and reputation of SPaRC champions invited to make presentations to high-level 
decision makers, their ability to take advantage of these policy windows, and the setting up 
of pilots, help convince said decision makers that SPaRC is an attractive and viable solution to 
one or more of the policy issues they face. 
b) The positive view of SPaRC adopted by high-level decision makers helps SPaRC trajectory 
actors find funding support for pilots and research in support of SPaRC. The realization among 
decision makers that SPaRC requires farmers to form cooperatives or similar to work 
effectively calibrates their support to rapid scaling of SPaRC.  
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c) The ability to take advantage of policy windows and being able to harness SPaRC to broader 
policy processes contributes to strengthened institutional support for SPaRC as a model that 
should be implemented. Increasing funding supports capacity development, including 
maintaining capacity. 
d) SPaRC has been included in SKY and KUSUM, but so far, its implementation on the ground has 
been restricted to pilots. Adoption of SPaRC by the target 1 million farmers depends on how 
SPaRC fairs in competition with KUSUM-A and -B (off-grid solar). 
e) Trajectory actors are involved in learning from SKY and adapting the SPaRC model accordingly. 
f) The impact of SPaRC on groundwater extraction and farmers’ income will depend upon a 
number of factors, including the subsidies, loans and feed-in tariffs offered to prospective 
adopters. 
 
The specific strategies used to achieve the immediate outcomes are shown in the theory of change 
diagram (Figure 3) and further detailed in Table 2. 
 








Strategy  Specifics from the timeline 
1. SHIFTING SOCIAL NORMS 
Designing a model for solar irrigation – SPaRC – 
that is relevant to several policy issues  
The idea of solar power as a remunerative crop (SPaRC) 
emerged within ITP in 2012 and 2013. The term SPaRC 
was coined in a chapter for a book written to influence 
the then-new government (Shah and Verma 2014) 
Establishing pilots that show SPaRC is practicable 
for farmers and DISCOMs 
First pilot with a single banana farmer in 2015, followed 
by Dhundi cooperative in 2016 and Majkuva 
cooperative in 2018. ITP and SDC support solarization of 
10 feeders under SKY starting in 2017 
Publishing in support of SPaRC in ways that 
reached key decision makers 
ITP targets the publication Economic and Political 
Weekly as having the highest readership among key 
decision makers and publishes four articles on SPaRC 
between 2014 and 2019 
2. CHANGE IN CAPACITY 
Maintaining the reputation needed to be invited 
to present to high-level decision makers 
Tushaar Shah and ITP included SPaRC in invited 
presentations to national and state ministers and 
secretaries six times from 2013 to 2016. Presentations 
also made to World Bank, Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations and World Energy 
Forum 
Maintaining the ability to take advantage of 
policy windows  
The main policy windows were the opportunities to 
present at high-level meetings. The presentations made 
were apparently well judged 
Having the flexibility to respond to much greater 
than expected media interest in SPaRC pilots 
In 2018, the Energy Secretary of Gujrat visited the 
Dhundi pilot followed by 500 visitors over the following 
six months 
3. STRENGTHENED SUPPORT BASE 
Forming partnerships and building capacity to 
establish solar cooperatives at scale 
ITP support to NDDB and REIL set up the Majkuva Village 
Solar Cooperative in 2018, followed by NDDB 
announcing an intent to use its experience setting up 
dairy cooperatives to help its members set up SPaRC 
ones in 2019 
Winning projects to set up pilots and carry out 
research in support of SPaRC 
ITP, together with partners, won four projects 
supported by three donors from 2015 to 2019, with a 
combined budget of more than USD 6 million 
Recognizing and responding to threats to SPaRC 
within KUSUM 
Recognition that the necessity of organizing farmers 
into groups for SPaRC to work well will be a disincentive 
to the fast and widespread implementation of KUSUM-
C. The response is for ITP to start raising the issue 
among trajectory partners 
 
 




EQ 2: What were WLE and CCAFS solar irrigation outcomes in India and how 
did WLE and CCAFS contribute to them? 
This overall evaluation question is tackled by answering the following sub-questions, agreed in the 
evaluation inception report. 
EQ 2.1: What are the main solar irrigation outcomes to which WLE and CCAFS have 
contributed? 
Finding 14: The main outcome to which WLE and CCAFS have contributed has been the inclusion of 
SPaRC in two government programs: as one of three components in the USD 50 billion KUSUM 
initiative and at the center of Gujarat’s SKY scheme (see Finding 2). The SKY scheme has reached 
3,400 farmers through 80 feeders solarized by 21 companies. SKY has had implementation issues 
that have led to some scaling back from the original targets, not least in explaining SPaRC to farmers 
and gaining the consent of at least 70% in pilot feeders. The SDC-funded and IWMI-led SoLAR-SA 
project is working with GERMI in India to learn lessons to guide the implementation of KUSUM-C. 
The field research planned as part of this project is delayed because Covid-19 has prevented any 
fieldwork.  
The KUSUM-C target is to support 1 million farmers to adopt SPaRC. As of October 2020, two states 
other than Gujarat have pilot schemes – Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka – to reach a combined total 
of little more than 500 farmers. All three pilots are designed differently, suggesting experimentation 
is happening to identify what works best, under what conditions.  
The impact of SPaRC on the ground is so far limited in relation to the 1 million farmers that KUSUM-C 
intends to help adopt SPaRC. There are about 20 farmers involved in the pilots being run by ITP and 
NDDB. The great majority of farmers currently engaging in SPaRC are enrolled in Gujarat’s SKY program 
that began in June 2018, as described in Error! Reference source not found.. As of March 2020, 80 o
ut of Gujarat’s 7,000 agricultural feeders had been solarized, involving 3,400 farmers.49  
 
 
Box 1: Gujarat’s SKY scheme 
SKY was a pilot scheme, first announced in 2017 and launched in 2018. Under the scheme, 80 out of 
Gujarat’s 7,000 agricultural feeders were to be solarized, covering an expected 12,400 farms in 33 
districts.50 SKY continues to be implemented in 2020. Farmers are provided with solar panels set at 
1.5 times the power rating of their grid-connected electric pumps, so, for example, a 7.5 hp pump 
would receive 9.5 kW of panels.  
 
The panels are connected to the grid in a similar way to the Gandhinager PV Rooftop Program. Farmers 
are paid on the basis of the power generated by their panels minus the power their pump consumes. 
If they are net consumers, they are charged for the difference. Most farmers are net suppliers because 
they generally grow two crops a year, not three, meaning that there are more than 100 days a year 
when they are not irrigating and so only supplying power to the grid. 
 
According to figures provided by GUVNL, 9.5 kW of panels costs INR 470,000. Of this amount, the 
farmer is expected to pay 5%. Loans are made available for 35% of the price, to be paid back over 7 
years at an interest rate of 4.5–6% during which time the farmer receives INR 7/net unit supplied to 
the grid. After 7 years, the net feed-in rate drops to INR 3.5/unit. In exchange for being part of SKY, 
famers agree to relinquish their ‘right’ to receive very cheap power from the grid and therefore the 
large subsidy that this requires the respective utility companies to make. 
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As of March 2000, 80 feeders had been solarized involving 3,400 farms.51 This represents a generating 
capacity of 80 MW. The work to connect the farms has been carried out by 21 contracted solar 
agencies on 5-year contracts. 
 
 
In March 2019, the Times of India reported that the Government of Gujarat had decided to scale SKY 
back because of implementation problems, including that farmers were finding it difficult to make 
money and were proving unwilling to give up the right to receive highly subsidized power from the 
grid. In December 2019, a Hindu BusinessLine article reported on two farmers with relatively large 
installations who were finding SPaRC profitable. One knowledgeable respondent confirmed that, 
while initially reluctant, farmers were now wanting to enroll in SKY.52 Another explained that some of 
the difficulty related to the variable frequency of power supplied to the feeders by the main grid, 
which was causing farmers’ systems to burn out, leaving them unable to earn income until their 
system was fixed.53  
 
The SKY scheme was designed by GUVNL and implemented through DISCOMs. Under the scheme, 
private sector companies were invited to tender to solarize feeders: in total 21 companies won 
contracts. According to one respondent, companies were ill equipped to convince at least 70% of the 
farmers to agree to solarize their feeder. The respondent felt that it would be better if a third-party 
organization sought farmers’ approval and carried out any social organization required, before 
companies tendered for the work.  
 
The recent SDC-funded SoLAR-SA project has been supporting farmers in 10 feeders to set up a 
cooperative. According to a respondent in the validation workshop, farmers have had more success in 
these 10 feeders because they have better understood how the system works; for example, how 
payments are calculated and made.54 Under the project, IWMI and GERMI are collaborating to better 
understand the costs and benefits of SKY, what is working well and what needs improving, so as to 
help inform implementation of KUSUM-C. This field research has been delayed as Covid-19 has 
prevented fieldwork since April 2020. 
 
In March 2019, the KUSUM scheme was given administrative approval with a budget of USD 50 billion 
over 5 years. The scheme has three components (KUSAM-A, KUSAM-B and KUSAM-C) for the 
installation of: 
 
A. 10,000 MW of decentralized ground-mounted, grid-connected power plants; 
B. 1.75 million stand-alone solar pumps 7.5 hp; 
C. 1 million grid-connected solar pumps 7.5 hp able to sell back to the grid;  
 
In addition to Gujarat’s SKY scheme, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka have launched KUSUM-C pilots.55 
In Andhra Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh Eastern Power Distribution Company Limited (APEPDCL) is 
implementing a pilot project that is replacing inefficient AC pump sets with more efficient DC ones 
connected to solar panels. Farmers can sell excess power back to the feeder but can only use power 
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generated by their own solar panels. As of July 2019, 216 solar pumps were installed on one feeder. 
Farmers receive INR 1.50/kWh feed-in tariff.56  
 
The Government of Karnataka launched the Sury Raitha Scheme in January 2020 to replace 310 
inefficient pumps. Under this scheme, grid-connected farmers can sell back a maximum of one-third 
of the power they generate per year, at the much higher feed-in tariff of INR 7.5/kWh. Farmers will 
first need to pay off the loans they received to purchase the equipment. A document describing the 
scheme estimated the payback period as 12 to 14 years.57 
EQ 2.2: Have there been any unexpected or negative outcomes? 
Finding 15: There are two potentially negative outcomes that derive from SPaRC being included in 
large government programs before pilots could be completed and lessons learned. Under SKY, the 
companies that have been subcontracted to solarize feeders are worried that they have been tied 
into overly rigid 7-year maintenance contracts when there is much to learn and improve to make 
SPaRC work. More generally, there is a risk that SPaRC will become seen as too complex to be scaled 
quickly because of the need to work with farmers and that this will leave the door open for KUSUM-
A, which does not require farmer involvement. 
A negative outcome for at least some of the companies that won tenders under SKY to solarize the 
feeders is that they have lost money, or expect to do so.58 SKY is designed such that the winning 
companies enter into a 7-year maintenance contract. It is only at the end of this contract that they will 
know if they have made a profit. Experience to date suggests some will not, because maintenance 
costs are much higher than expected, due in part to poor-quality power from the grid causing damage 
to components. The other unexpected cost has been the time and effort required to persuade 70% of 
the farmers in their respective feeders to agree to feeder solarization (Finding 14). The sense is that 
the contracts companies have entered into are too rigid for a pilot where there is much to learn and 
improve.  
 
Another potential negative outcome is that premature inclusion of SPaRC at the center of a large 
government program, before pilots have been completed and learning harvested from them, will lead 
to SPaRC becoming seen as too complex to be implemented quickly and at scale (see Finding 4). There 
is some evidence of this happening: it was reported in the validation workshop that Gujarat is more 
reticent about SPaRC in KUSUM-C than it was with SKY. The sense in the validation workshop was that 
a recent political commitment made by the Government of Gujarat to provide all farmers with daytime 
power within a year will likely favor KUSUM-A, which does not require farmers to be involved. 
EQ 2.3: How did WLE and CCAFS contribute to SPaRC outcomes? 
Finding 16: WLE and CCAFS are two of a number of trajectory actors that contributed to SPaRC 
outcomes, as described by the SPaRC theory of change shown in Figure 3 and Finding 13. WLE 
contributed through ITP, which is mapped onto WLE. Three of the four projects that have supported 
work on SPaRC were mapped onto WLE. The fourth was mapped onto CCAFS. ITP’s contribution has 
been central: ITP has led or co-led on all nine of the strategies found to be driving the theory of 
change. CCAFS’ contribution was catalytic in providing flexible funding that made the Dhundi pilot 
possible. ITP and SPaRC have influenced WLE’s work in Africa. 
                                                          
56 P 12 of http://www.greenbusinesscentre.com/energyawards/enepresent19/General_104_APEDCL_0.pdf 
57 https://sarkariyojana.com/surya-raitha-scheme/ 
58 Respondent 9 




It is credible to claim that without ITP/WLE and CCAFS, SKY and KUSUM-C would not have happened, 
or would have been very different with less emphasis on reducing groundwater depletion. 
The way that SPaRC trajectory actors contributed to these policy outcomes is described in the theory 
of change shown in Figure 3 and Finding 13. Trajectory actors are shown in Table 3. WLE’s contribution 
is that of ITP, as ITP is mapped onto WLE. The contribution of the funding support organizations is as 
follows: 59 
 WLE funded ITP senior scientist time to engage in all SPaRC work, in particular to write the 
articles and papers and attend the key events that helped SPaRC gain recognition among 
policy makers as discussed under Finding 3 and Finding 5;  
 CCAFS funded and made possible the Dhundi pilot that proved catalytic in moving the 
perception of SPaRC from a good idea in theory to an approach that worked on the ground, 
deserving inclusion in KUSUM; 
 Tata Trusts funded other costs associated with attending key events; bonuses to SPaRC pilot 
farmers; and ITP interns who did the field work and data collection; 
 SDC provided significant additional funding support, including funding the four-country IWMI-
led SoLAR-SA project from 2019; 
 GIZ funded the Solar Irrigation Expansion in India Partnership to develop tools and case studies 
for solar irrigation promotion at scale, in particular for SPaRC. 
 
Table 3. SPaRC trajectory actors. 
Funding support CCAFS, GIZ, SDC, Tata Trusts and WLE 
Implementing 
actors: 
GERMI, GUVNL, ITP, MGVCL, NDDB and REIL 
Boundary partners: Aga Khan Rural Support Program India, DSC, MNRE, Shashvat Cleantech and 
World Bank 
 
ITP’s contribution to the SPaRC outcome trajectory has been pivotal. It was agreed by the participants 
in the validation workshop that if ITP had not run the pilots, then “SPaRC would have remained a 
theory,” and that the trajectory “came together because of ITP.”60 This is consistent with Table 2 which 
shows that ITP was the lead actor in all of the strategies identified in the timeline shown in Appendix 
1, except in the establishment of the Majkuva Village Solar Cooperative which was led by NDDB, 
supported by ITP. 
 
CCAFS played a vital role in providing the funding for the Dhundi pilot, which has been the most 
influential of the three pilots, two led by ITP and the one led by NDDB. 
 
SPaRC has influenced WLE’s work in Africa.61 While grid-connected solar pumps are not appropriate 
for much of Africa, what is relevant is the ITP/WLE approach to supplying solar irrigation through 
developing business models and other ways of organizing farmers so they can sustainably and 
inclusively benefit from solar pumping. Also, ITP’s SPaRC analysis has highlighted the role that 
subsidies and policy can play in adoption and farmers’ behavior, both positively and negatively, with 
respect to such issues as groundwater overextraction. WLE has provided ITP staff with a platform to 
share their experience with Mercy Corps and the USAID-funded Innovation Lab for Small-Scale 
Irrigation,62 both of which work in Africa. To facilitate such sharing, WLE has organized its work on 
solar irrigation into one project, entitled “On and off-grid solar in Africa and Asia.” 
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EQ 3: Did WLE and CCAFS consider gender or the needs of marginalized groups 
in their work to achieve outcomes?  
 
Finding 17: The ongoing IWMI-led SoLAR-SA project has a strong focus on gender equality and social 
inclusion (GESI). Largely through carrying out policy-relevant research with key national actors, the 
project hopes to increase the proportion of women owning SIPs from 5% to 10% and the proportion 
of small and marginal farmers owning SIPs from 10% to 30% in four years, in Bangladesh, India, 
Nepal and Pakistan. The way the SoLAR-SA project is tackling GESI has influenced recent WLE project 
development in Africa. 
By far the largest research investment to support the SPaRC outcome trajectory is the USD 5.4 million 
being provided by SDC to the IWMI-led project SoLAR-SA. The four-year project, which began in 2019, 
works in four countries – Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan. According to one respondent, “SPaRC 
literally sparked the idea of the project,”63 which is partnering with relevant government organizations 
to pilot grid-connected solar pumps and the institutional arrangements needed to ensure they deliver 
the benefits expected. 
 
A main focus of the project is on GESI. The project aims to “influence SIP policies to enhance the 
outreach of SIPs to vulnerable groups.” The project document notes that “currently, only 10% of SIPs 
are owned by small and marginal farmers and less than 5% are owned by women farmers.”64 By 
influencing SIP policies, the project hopes that, by 2024, 30% of SIPs will be owned by small and 
marginal farmers and 10% will be owned by women farmers in each of the countries. Broad GESI-
sensitive policy questions that the project aims to answer include: 
 How have current SIP policies and programs fared in terms of their impacts on farmers’ 
livelihoods and gender equity? 
 Which financial model generates maximum willingness among small-scale and marginal 
farmers to adopt SIPs? 
 What kinds of technical and institutional modalities work best for grid connection of SIPs and 
how can these modalities be optimized for better groundwater governance in the long term? 
More specific questions include: 
 Will farmers who own SIPs in India continue selling water to their more marginal neighbors 
who do not? 
 What is the impact of solar pumps on irrigation accessibility for small and marginalized 
farmers in Bangladesh? 
 What incentives can increase the women’s ownership of SIPs in Nepal? 
 
Other GESI-aware project activities include training both male and female pump technicians. 
 
The way the SoLAR-SA project is tackling GESI has influenced recent WLE project development in 
Africa, in particular how to deal with gender gap and creditworthiness issues in the development of 
solar irrigation business models.65  
 
EQ 4: Are WLE and CCAFS outcomes likely to be sustainable over the long 
term? 
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Finding 18: The sustainability and impact of KUSUM-C will depend in part on whether the target of 
1 million farmers adopting SPaRC is met and how SPaRC is made to work. Whether KUSUM-C is fully 
implemented will depend to a large extent on how different actors make sense of KUSUM-C pilots 
with respect to two questions: whether the time, cost and difficulty of involving and organizing 
farmers to make SPaRC work in practice are worth the benefit; and whether adopting farmers can 
convincingly increase their income while at the same time pumping less groundwater. The answers 
to both questions remain uncertain.  
The different actors that will individually and collectively decide the impact and sustainability of SPaRC 
include state governments, certain ministries, in particular MNRE, DISCOMs and their umbrella 
organizations, CBOs and NGOs and farmers. With regard to whether forming solar cooperatives or 
similar is worth the cost and difficulty, Finding 12 concludes that there are some grounds for optimism 
that NGOs and CBOs can facilitate the formation of solar cooperatives or similar. On the other hand, 
as discussed under Finding 15, recent political commitments to provide all farmers with daytime solar 
power within a year may favor KUSUM-A, which can be scaled up faster than KUSUM-C. 
 
The question as to whether adopting farmers can convincingly increase their income while pumping 
less water is being addressed by the project SoLAR-SA, as discussed under Finding 4. The project is 
also carrying out research on the formation of farmer solar cooperatives. If farmers start to actively 
lobby to adopt SPaRC, because they believe it can benefit them, then this would work in favor of 
KUSUM-C.  
 
Finding 19: The future sustainability and impact of SPaRC also depends on how KUSUM-C competes 
against KUSUM-A and -B. It is useful to think of KUSUM, and the political imperative to tackle the 
energy-water-agriculture nexus (see Finding 12), as creating an ecosystem in which various versions 
of KUSUM’s three options will adapt and find their niches in an evolving, complex and uncertain 
process. All three models have advantages and disadvantages: 
 KUSUM-A – can be rapidly scaled but currently includes no incentive to pump less 
groundwater; 
 KUSUM-B – solar pumps do not require the complication of a grid connection, no need to 
organize farmers but equally no incentives have been included to pump less groundwater; 
 KUSUM-C – provides farmers with an alternative source of income and an incentive to pump 
less groundwater but scaling will likely be slow due to the need for farmers to organize. 
 
KUSUM-A and -C are initially being implemented in pilot mode to install 1,000 MW capacity and 
100,000 grid-connected pumps, respectively66 while KUSUM-B is in full implementation. 
Under KUSUM-A, typically a private sector company signs a contract with a utility company to provide 
power to an agricultural feeder at a rate fixed for 25 years. The utility provides the land to set up the 
solar power plants. As far as farmers are concerned, the difference they see is that power is provided 
during daylight hours, which should be more reliable than the power previously supplied from the 
national grid. The attraction of KUSUM-A is that it requires very little public sector funding and can be 
rolled out quickly as a way to increase the proportion of renewable power used in agriculture. The 
disadvantage of KUSUM-A is that it provides no incentive for farmers to pump less groundwater, and 
indeed is likely to lead to further overextraction if the electricity supply to farmers improves as 
expected. However, an incentive scheme could be retrofitted to KUSUM-A along the lines of the “save 
water, earn money” scheme that the World Bank is piloting in Punjab. Under this scheme, farmers are 
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given a free power allocation per cropping season and are paid for power they do not use at a rate of 
INR 4/unit. The pilot has shown water savings of 30%.67  
 
KUSUM-B aims to support the installation of 1.75 million off-grid solar pumps to replace diesel pumps. 
It is also an option where strengthening and extending rural feeders to allow for grid-connected solar 
pumps is seen as prohibitively expensive. Two respondents favored establishing microgrids68 that 
would connect a number of KUSUM-B farmers together to collectively generate and supply power at 
a local level. MNRE is considering providing farmers with a universal controller to allow them to use 
surplus power for such activities as powering stationary farm machinery, water purification and cold 
storage with batteries, as well as for domestic use. The hope is that the value of power from these 
microgrids could be high enough to provide farmers with an incentive to reduce solar power used for 
pumping water. This could be considered a SPaRC/KUSUM-B hybrid. 
 
Under KUSUM-C, farmers acquire solar panels matched to their pump (typically, 1.5 times the pump 
power rating, i.e., a 1 kW pump would qualify for solar panels that can generate a peak of 1.5 kW) and 
the equipment to meter and connect them to grid. They pay for the panels through a portion they pay 
themselves, plus a loan and a subsidy. They are also given a guaranteed feed-in tariff for a number of 
years.  
 
The farmer contribution, the loan percentage and its terms, the subsidy, the feed-in tariff and the 
length of the price guarantee can all vary, making SPaRC more or less attractive to farmers and state 
politicians, and more or less likely to provide an incentive to reduce groundwater extraction. For 
example, under the SKY pilot, farmers pay 5% of the cost, the Government of India provides a grant of 
30% and the loan is 65% to be repaid over 7 years at an interest rate of about 5%. Farmers receive a 
relatively high feed-in tariff of INR 7 per net unit supplied to the grid to help repay the loan. The tariff 
drops to INR 3.5/unit after 7 years and is guaranteed for a further 18 years. If, as expected, the cost 
of solar generation continues to fall – one estimate is it will fall to INR 1.9/unit by 203069 – pressure 
will come to reduce feed-in tariffs or reimpose subsidies. If this happens, the subsidy will be on power 
sold back to the grid only, not on all electrical power supplied for pumping, as is currently the case. In 
addition, the capital cost of SPaRC will also likely fall, meaning that new adopters will be prepared to 
accept a lower feed-in tariff while still viewing SPaRC as profitable. 
 
Finding 20: In evolving processes, the quality and timing of decision making about what variants to 
select is critical to achieving beneficial outcomes (Alexrod and Cohen 2000). The evaluation team 
developed a simulation model to help with decision making and so help the evolving process achieve 
beneficial outcomes. The model finds that, in Gujarat, KUSUM-C is more beneficial than KUSUM-A, 
if it can be made to work. It also identifies the conditions under which KUSUM-C faces the strongest 
competition from KUSUM-A. The model identifies policy implications, which are written up in the 
companion simulation modeling report. 
To help improve decision making as to whether to opt for KUSUM-A or -C and the terms to offer 
farmers adopting KUSUM-C, this evaluation developed a simulation model to explore the conditions 
that favor KUSUM-C versus KUSUM-A. The model is described in a companion report entitled Outcome 
Evaluation of Climate-Smart Research on Solar-Powered Irrigation in India: Simulation Modeling. That 
report helps answer EQ 5 as well as identifying policy implications for tackling the energy-water-
agriculture nexus. In terms of the competition between KUSUM-A and -C, the model finds that 
KUSUM-C is likely to face the strongest competition from KUSUM-A when:  
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• Subsidies are decreased or removed; 
• Loans are decreased; 
• Tariff prices are reduced; 
• Demand and price are high for buying water (e.g., cash crops); 
• Non-payment by DISCOMs becomes prevalent; 
• Groundwater is not limiting; 
• Local institutions are weak; 
• Land for solar banks is available; 
• Daytime power is made available. 
 
EQ 5: Looking forward to 2040, what are the projected benefits for people and 
the environment? 
 
Finding 21: Running the simulation model developed to answer the evaluation question for KUSUM-
A and -C yielded the following expected values, assuming KUSUM runs for 20 years in Gujarat with 
a target population of nearly 1 million farmers. Units of millions are denoted with ‘m.’  
Indicator KUSUM-C KUSUM-A 
Number of people using clean energy in irrigation  439,940 268,260 
Number of farmers deriving additional income from surplus 
solar power sales 
439,940 0 
Area irrigated using clean energy sources (ha) 476,093 292,575 
Change in farm water use (m3/yr) -14,272 40,039 
Net present value per farm (USD) 13,332 1,137 
Aggregate net present value without taking GHG savings into 
account (USD) 
3,358 m 183 m 
Aggregate net present value taking GHG savings into account 
(USD) 
1,032,194 m 307,003 m 
 
The evaluation went beyond the original ToR to compare KUSUM-C with KUSUM-A, to run a number 
of scenarios of interest to stakeholders, and to identify policy implications and priorities for future 
research and monitoring. This analysis and its findings can be found in the companion report 
Outcome Evaluation of Climate-Smart Research on Solar-Powered Irrigation in India: Simulation 
Modeling. 
 
The original intent was to answer the evaluation question (EQ 5) for the water-scarce and energy-rich 
states in India for which SPaRC can work. These states include Punjab, Haryana, Western Uttar 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Tamil Nadu.  
 
After finding that different variations of SPaRC were being piloted in different states (see Finding 14) 
it became clear that data input would also vary from state to state. Hence, the evaluation team 
decided to address the evaluation question to Gujarat, which has the most developed SPaRC pilot and, 
therefore, the most solid set of input data. At the same time, the evaluation team developed the 
model in close collaboration with ITP such that ITP can take over the running of the model and carry 
out a similar analysis for other states once the versions of SPaRC that they intend to use become 
clearer. 
 
The other change from the original plan was the inclusion of KUSUM-A in the model. This was at the 
request of ITP, which sees KUSUM-A as the main competition to KUSUM-C. KUSUM-A does not provide 
any opportunity for adopters to earn money from selling power, nor any incentive to pump less 
groundwater. It does not help address the energy-water-agriculture nexus. It was felt important to 




show the comparative performance of both parts of KUSUM to help states decide whether to opt for 
KUSUM-A, KUSUM-C or both. 
 
Since limited adoption is projected to have occurred in the first few years, and general patterns carry 
through to 2040, we have omitted the presentation of projected benefits in 2022 and 2030 as 
originally envisaged in the ToR for the evaluation. 
 
As Table 4 shows, expected values of farm-level net present value (NPV) are over 10 times greater for 
KUSUM-C than KUSUM-A. The high net income in KUSUM-C is driven by the sale of power back to the 
grid (about two-thirds of the income on average) and savings due to the adoption of solar (about one-
third of the income on average). The higher aggregated NPV for KUSUM-C reflects the higher farm 
income and the higher adoption rate. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of net present values (NPV) in USD in 2040 at different levels of aggregation. 
The expected value (EV) and the 10th and 90th percentile values are shown. Units of millions are 
denoted with ‘m’. Greenhouse gas (GHG) benefits are included.  
 
 Net present value (USD) 
Level 
NPV 10th 
percentile NPV EV 
NPV 90th 
percentile 
Farm KUSUM-C 1,720 13,332 28,938 
Farm KUSUM-A 431 1,137 2,128 
Aggregated KUSUM-C -1 m 3,358 m 10,184 m 
Aggregated KUSUM-A 1 m 183 m 463 m 
Aggregated all 1 m 3,541 m 10,454 m 
DISCOM KUSUM-C -138 m 1,014 m 3,086 m 
DISCOM KUSUM-A -353 m -65 m 146 m 
DISCOM all -263 m 949 m 3,047 m 
Water KUSUM-C 0 m 92 m 248 m 
Water KUSUM-A -327 m -125 m 0 m 
GHG KUSUM-C 1,046 m 1,032,194 m 2,352,328 m 
GHG KUSUM-A 549 m 307,003 m 806,512 m 
Environ all 2,202 m 1,339,163 m 3,235,047 m 
Project 2,318 m 1,343,654 m 3,251,793 m 
 
 
The farm-level distribution of NPV is much wider in KUSUM-C than KUSUM-A and there is a 5% chance 
of making a loss in KUSUM-C due to combinations of lower income and higher discount rates in some 
trials. However, there is a large upside tail on KUSUM-C, with a 10% chance of obtaining over USD 
30,000/ha discounted net benefit over 20 years. Further disaggregation of the downsides and upsides 
is warranted and would provide pointers to which policies may increase opportunities and reduce 
risks. 
 
Results for additional indicators in 2040 are presented in Table . The wide (100-fold) range in the 
number of adopters reflects the wide range in the Bass model adoption parameters.70 At the farm 
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level, KUSUM-C incurs a small chance of loss, as previously described, whereas KUSUM-A has no 
chance of loss. Consequently, the number of farmers profiting is 97% of adopters on average. The 
wide range in the irrigated area reflects the wide range of adoption rates and its distribution between 
KUSUM-C and KUSUM-A.  
 
There are opportunities for moderate water savings (water use of -14,300 m3/yr on average) with 
KUSUM-C even at the 90th percentile, compared with increased water use in KUSUM-A (40,000 m3/yr 
on average). The project-level return on investment is very large on average, even without considering 
GHG benefits, but is slightly negative at the 10th percentile. Including GHG benefits, the return on 
investment is extremely high at all levels of probability. 
 
Table 5. Distribution of values of additional indicators in 2040. The expected value (EV) and the 10th 
and 90th percentile values are shown.  
Indicator 10th percentile EV 90th percentile  
Target population (number of farmers) 804,469 997,505 1,193,770  
Adopters KUSUM-C 7704 439,940 828,491  
Adopters KUSUM-A 4861 268,260 567,569  
Adopters total 13,594 708,201 1,139,426  
Chance of farm-level loss KUSUM-C - 5% -  
Chance of farm-level loss KUSUM-A - 0% -  
Number of farmers profiting - 687,963 -  
Irrigated area KUSUM-C (ha) 7732 476,093 1,116,923  
Irrigated area KUSUM-A (ha) 5100 292,575 705,821  
Irrigated area total (ha) 13,671 768,668 1,737,344  
Change in farm water use KUSUM-C (m3/yr) -35,087 -14,272 -1342  
Change in farm water use KUSUM-A (m3/yr) 9304 40,039 74,914  
Return on investment without GHGs (%) -29 349 882  
Return on investment with GHGs (%) 4088 112,059 273,393  
 
In addition to helping to answer EQ 4 and EQ 5 on sustainability and potential impact, respectively, 
the write-up of the model presents the simulation of several scenarios. The scenarios were identified 
by experts and through two stakeholder workshops as important for policy decision making and 
supporting research. The choice of scenarios was also informed by a sensitivity analysis. The scenarios 
involve the varying of the following parameters: 
 Adoption; 
 Subsidies and loans; 
 Feed-in tariff prices; 
 Degree of farmer organization into solar cooperatives, or similar; 
 Risk of non-payment by DISCOMs; 
 Availability of land for KUSUM-A; 
 Low existing groundwater levels; 
 Proposal to provide daytime power. 
 
The report also identifies policy implications and priorities for future research and monitoring. 
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Conclusion 1: Since 2012, CGIAR has catalyzed and played a key role in an outcome trajectory by which 
the idea of solar power as a remunerative crop (SPaRC) gained recognition, became seen as workable, 
and has been adopted as one of the three components of the USD 50 billion Government of India 
KUSUM scheme.  
 
Conclusion 2: The policy window theory helped understand how CGIAR contributed to the trajectory 
by: 
 Framing SPaRC as a potential solution to at least five politically important issues;  
 Maintaining and exercising the capacity to present, demonstrate and write about SPaRC in 
ways that together proved extremely effective at influencing government policy; 
 Forming partnerships and a coalition to help create a more enabling environment for SPaRC; 
 Identifying and answering research questions, the timely answer of which is needed to help 
SPaRC compete against other ways of solarizing mechanical irrigation that are less beneficial 
to farmers and the environment, but easier to implement. 
 
Conclusion 3: WLE, CCAFS, TATA Trusts, SDC and GIZ together made a strong contribution to the SPaRC 
outcome trajectory:  
 WLE funded IWMI senior scientist time to engage in all SPaRC work, in particular to write the 
articles and papers and attend the key events that helped SPaRC gain recognition among 
policy makers;  
 CCAFS funded and made possible the Dhundi pilot initiative that proved catalytic in moving 
the perception of SPaRC from a good idea in theory to an approach that worked on the ground, 
deserving inclusion in KUSUM; 
 Tata Trusts funded other costs associated with attending key events; bonuses to SPaRC pilot 
farmers; and ITP interns who did the field work and data collection; 
 SDC provided significant additional funding support, including funding the four-country IWMI-
led SoLAR-SA project from 2019; 
 GIZ funded the Solar Irrigation Expansion in India Partnership to develop tools and case studies 
for solar irrigation promotion at scale, in particular for SPaRC. 
 
Conclusion 4: By far the largest project supporting the SPaRC outcome trajectory – SoLAR-SA – has 
brought a strong emphasis on GESI. This is manifest in addressing two policy-relevant questions in 
particular: 
 How have current solar irrigation policies and programs impacted on farmers’ livelihoods and 
gender equity? 
 Which financial model generates maximum willingness among small-scale and marginal 
farmers to adopt solar irrigation? 
The project has influenced the design of solar irrigation projects that have also adopted a strong GESI 
focus. 
 
Conclusion 5: The SPaRC outcome trajectory clearly shows that influencing policy is a route to scale, 
which is important for CGIAR. ITP has been very effective in influencing solar irrigation policy. Despite 
this, ITP is unique in CGIAR in the following ways: 
 Its equal partnership between a CGIAR Center (IWMI) and a foundation concerned with 
development (Tata Trusts); 
 Its objective to help policy makers at all levels address their water challenges by translating 
research findings into practical policy recommendations – this is not a research objective but 
rather one that speaks to bridging research and development; 




 Its employment of people with a management rather than a research background;71 this aligns 
well with ITP’s mandate for ‘problem-solving’ research with a strong bias toward field action; 
 Its practice of giving more credit for policy-relevant publications than academic ones; 
 Its level of comfort with policy engagement. 
 
ITP is a bridging organization (Davila et al. 2006),72 a type of organization that is identified in the 
literature as important for research impact (Ekboir 2009). There is much for CGIAR to learn from ITP’s 
experience should it wish to see a greater return on its research investment through influencing policy. 
 
Conclusion 6: It is useful to think of KUSUM, and the political imperative to tackle the energy-water-
agriculture nexus (see Finding 12), as creating an ecosystem in which various versions of KUSUM’s 
three options, and others, will compete in an evolving, complex and inherently uncertain process. 
Which versions find niches, where, and whether they help India tackle the nexus, will depend on the 
timing and quality of decision making. The evaluation team has developed a simulation model to help, 
in a small way, decision makers to gain a better sense of likely outcomes for states, starting with 
Gujarat, adopting KUSUM-C and/or KUSUM-A.  
 
Conclusion 7: The simulation model shows that under expected conditions, KUSUM-C gives better 
outcomes for farmers, DISCOMs, groundwater extraction and reduction in GHG emissions than 
KUSUM-A. KUSUM-C is likely to face the strongest competition from KUSUM-A when:  
• Subsidies are decreased or removed; 
• Loans are decreased; 
• Tariff prices are reduced; 
• Demand and price are high for buying water (e.g., cash crops); 
• Non-payment by DISCOMs becomes prevalent; 
• Groundwater is not limiting; 
• Local institutions are weak; 
• Land for solar banks is available; 
• Daytime power is made available. 
Both KUSUM-A and -C are at risk from a falling market rate for solar-generated power in India. 
 
Conclusion 8: By far the greatest benefit derived from both KUSUM-A and -C is the reduction of GHG 
emissions by replacing fossil fuel use with solar power generation, when a notional price is paid for 
reducing CO2 emissions. GHG emission reductions are large in both KUSUM-A and -C. KUSUM-C’s 
unique attraction is that it can potentially deliver other benefits, including increased farmer income, 




Recommendation 1: For ITP to continue to play a central role in the SPaRC outcome trajectory. 
Given the potential impact of SPaRC, and the huge return on research investment that this would 
bring, WLE, IWMI, CCAFS and Tata Trusts should continue to support ITP in playing a central role in 
the SPaRC outcome trajectory. The policy window theory and progress to date suggest the following 
strategies are likely to be beneficial: 
 Maintaining the reputation of ITP so it is invited to present to high-level decision makers; 
 Maintaining the ability to take advantage of policy windows; 
 Forming partnerships to build capacity to establish solar cooperatives at scale; 
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 Carrying out research to support the adaptation and evolution of SPaRC to maximize its benefits, in 
particular to marginalized groups; 
 Strengthening a coalition of actors who believe in SPaRC as a way to tackle the energy-water-agriculture 
nexus. 
 
Recommendation 2: For WLE and CCAFS to propose a synthesis across recent outcome evaluations 
as to how programmatic research has achieved impact at scale, to inform the move to One CGIAR. 
Several CRPs have invested in outcome evaluations since 2019, including WLE, CCAFS, RTB and A4NH. 
At the same time, CGIAR is going through a reorganization to become One CGIAR such that scientific 
innovations are deployed faster, at a larger scale and at a reduced cost, having a greater impact where 
they are needed the most. 73 It would therefore be timely to carry out a synthesis across the 
evaluations to appreciate and learn lessons from what has worked. For example, this and the 
RTB/A4NH evaluation, show that influencing policy is clearly important for achieving impact at scale, 
and advocacy is important for achieving policy change. CGIAR is generally uncomfortable with 
explicitly engaging in advocacy. Learning from how CRPs have successfully supported advocacy efforts, 
regardless of whether the term was used, would likely yield worthwhile lessons for One CGIAR. 
 
Recommendation 3: For WLE and CCAFS to support the handing over of the simulation model to ITP 
The simulation model is easily accessible as a native Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with a linked input 
datasheet and includes a dashboard with the graphical display of results and a facility to easily 
simulate various policy scenarios. The model input datasheet can be readily edited to apply the model 
to different states in India. As better data become available, especially for sensitive variables, such as 
adoption rates, the uncertainties in projected benefits will be reduced. Hence the model can be used 
as a learning tool and the projection of benefits updated regularly over time. The use of SIPmathTM 
tools for Excel makes it relatively easy for a graduate-level analyst to build new assumptions into the 
model. With further effort, additional solar models could also be added. ITP has had exposure to the 
model and has the technical knowledge to parameterize the input distributions. We recommend that 
WLE and CCAFS support the handing over of the simulation model to ITP and consider further training 
and technical support to help develop ITP’s capacity in its use. 
 
Recommendation 4: For the CGIAR System Organization to consider whether the simulation 
modeling approach used in this evaluation has broader applicability 
Additional data or information from applied research have no value unless they improve decision 
making – for example, decisions on what interventions should be promoted to provide the most 
favorable livelihood and environmental outcomes at least cost and risk. It is impossible to know what 
research will produce value without first quantifying the current state of uncertainty and then seeing 
which uncertainties are critical for outcomes. There is also strong demand from donors and other 
stakeholders for CGIAR to project and monitor benefits. 
 
In this evaluation, the simulation modeling approach required researchers to quantify their 
assumptions and uncertainty in adoption, costs, benefits and risks associated with alternative solar 
irrigation models. We think this process of quantifying the theory of change led to deeper thought and 
analysis on causal factors affecting adoption and impact of solar irrigation alternatives than would 
otherwise have been the case. The modeling identified several priority areas for research and 
monitoring, based on where uncertainty reduction would most affect projected outcomes.  
 
The SIPmathTM open-standard approach used in this study could provide the foundation for an 
enterprise-wide platform for representing uncertainty and including uncertainty and risk in cost-
benefit analysis. SIPmathTM is readily accessible to everyone in Excel but is also applicable across 
platforms (e.g., R, Python). We therefore recommend this approach for consideration as a CGIAR-wide 
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complement in ex-ante and ex-post impact evaluations, and for use in research project screening at 
various stage gates based on projected benefits. 
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Appendix 1: Timeline of the SPaRC outcome trajectory 
 
The SPaRC outcome trajectory is the changing pattern of interactions between actors, institutions and 
technology that has led to the inclusion of SPaRC in the SKY and KUSUM schemes. To understand how 
ITP, WLE and CCAFS contributed, it is necessary to understand how the SPaRC trajectory was 
influenced by a broader solar irrigation trajectory and, in turn, how this broader trajectory was 
influenced by a groundwater irrigation trajectory (see Finding 1). The following timeline describes key 
events and processes in all three trajectories. It was constructed by the evaluator though interviews 
and document review and then validated by 13 out of 19 interviewees in a virtual workshop (see 
Appendix 3). A narrative that links elements of the timeline together is provided in Appendix 2. 
 
 
















Appendix 2: History of the SPaRC outcome trajectory 
The following is a written description that links together the events and processes shown on the 
timeline in Appendix 1, as a way of identifying causal links between them. It represents part of the 
analysis that went into identifying the findings in the main report, as well as helping the reader 
understand the SPaRC trajectory story. 
 
1951 
Groundwater irrigation – the pumping of water from wells – has always been used in India but at 
relatively low levels. In 1951 there were only 5,000 mechanized pumps in India but by 2000 this had 
increased to 19 million and stands at 22 to 25 million in 2018. 74  
 
1970s 
The rapid increase in the numbers of wells and pumps began in the 1970s, with the onset of the Green 
Revolution, which has also been called the tubewell revolution (Repetto 1994). The ability for farmers 
to irrigate using groundwater helped address a large difference in access to irrigation between farmers 
within the command area of surface irrigation schemes and those in dryland areas, and between large 
and small farmers (Shah 2009). As of 2019, 60% of India’s irrigated agriculture is via groundwater.75 
 
1980s 
In the 1980s, government policy was to continue to support the installation of tubewells as a way of 
reducing inequality between areas with canal-fed surface irrigation and those without. In Gujarat, and 
elsewhere, decentralized village-level groundwater markets became established in which farmers 
with pumps sold water to their neighbors, at a relatively high price compared to water available to 
farmers in areas with surface irrigation. The Chief Minister of Gujarat put pressure on the Gujarat 
Electricity Utility to reduce the cost of electricity for pumping. Research in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil 
Nadu found that tubewell owners charged less for water when they were charged for power according 
to the capacity of their pump rather than by metered power consumption. This was because reading 
the meters of thousands of pumps was expensive to the distribution companies and some corruption 
had built up around the use of meters. Tushaar Shah, who was then working for the Rural 
Management Institute in Anand, Gujarat, shared the research findings with the Chair of the Gujarat 




In the 1990s, the overextraction of groundwater began emerging as a serious problem, caused by an 
increasing number of wells connected to cheap power. At the same time, the cheap electricity that 




In 2000, IWMI and the Sir Ratan Tata Trust – one of the oldest philanthropic institutions in India – 
established the IWMI–Tata Water Policy Research Program (ITP). ITP’s objective is to help policy 
makers at the central, state and local levels address their water challenges – in areas such as 
sustainable groundwater management, water scarcity, and rural poverty – by translating research 
findings into practical policy recommendations. Tushaar Shah was part of ITP from the outset.  
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In 2000, in an attempt to solve the twin problems of the overextraction of groundwater and overly 
cheap electricity, the then Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, tried to introduce metering of all 
pumps so that farmers would be charged on their water consumption. The attempt failed because 
farmer protests forced the government to make a U-turn. DISCOMs continued to lose money and the 
Government of India was forced to bail them out for the first time in 2002, in Gujarat, as well as in 
other water-scarce states dependent on tubewells.  
 
During this time, Shah et al. (2003) wrote a paper that put forward a compromise solution in which 
farmers would be rationed to 8 hours a day of reliable power. This would involve creating separate 
feeders for agricultural power, independent of domestic supply.  
 
Appreciating the power of the agrarian vote, from 2002, Narendra Modi in Gujarat and Shivraj Singh 
Chauhan in Madhya Pradesh, pursued agricultural growth through irrigation development as a 
political strategy, claiming personal credit for double-digit agricultural growth in their states.78 They 
both went on to win three elections on this platform.  
 
As part of agricultural development in Gujarat, separate agricultural feeders were established in 1,000 
days from 2006. Other states have followed Gujarat’s example. 
 
In 2008, GUVNL, the electrical services umbrella company operating in Gujarat, started working on 
solar pumping.79 Gujarat has 320 days of sunshine a year, which makes PVs an obvious choice as a 
green alternative to diesel and grid-connected power supply where power comes largely from coal- 
and nuclear-fired power stations. The cost of PVs was more than USD 5,000 per installed kW 
generating capacity in 2008, making solar pumping a very expensive option. However, over the next 5 
years costs fell by 50%.80  
 
2009 
In 2009, Gujarat launched its Solar Power Policy, as the first comprehensive solar policy in India, 
offering incentives to investors over a 25-year period. The policy helped the state increase from 20 
MW solar generation capacity in 2010 to 5,500 MW in 2016 (Pathak and Muller 2016). By 2013, 
Gujarat had over 50% of the share of solar power capacity in the country. 
 
Gujarat’s policy was in response to the National Solar Mission, also approved in 2009. The mission set 
a national target of 20,000 MW of grid-connected solar power by 2022 (which was increased to 
100,000 MW by 2015). Importantly, the mission established Renewable Purchase Obligations (RPOs) 
that compel DISCOMs to purchase a given percentage of solar power. Gujarat adopted RPOs for its 




In 2010, the Government of Gujarat started subsidizing 87% of the cost of solar pumps. At this point 
there were only 7,500 solar pumps in all of India.81 
 
2012 
As part of Gujarat’s Solar Power Policy, the state launched the Gandhinager PV Rooftop Program, the 
first of its kind in India. In the program, private sector companies rent rooftops on public and private 
                                                          
78 http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/iwmi-tata/PDFs/iwmi-tata_water_policy_research_highlight-issue_01_2016.pdf 
79 Respondent 17 
80 Estimates based on https://www.pv-tech.org/news/balance-of-system-costs-key-to-further-solar-system-
cost-reductions-says-ir 
81 https://sun-connect-news.org/fileadmin/DATEIEN/Dateien/New/CM_LII_45_111107_TushaarShah_etal.pdf 




buildings to install PV panels. The companies, selected in a competitive bidding process, were paid INR 
3/kWh supplied. 
 
In the 10 years since ITP was established, its researchers had become increasingly concerned about 
the potential for solar pumps to exacerbate groundwater depletion in dry areas, because pump 
owners paid almost nothing for pumping more water than they needed. The ITP team hit upon the 
idea of allowing farmers to sell the excess power they generated back to the grid, in a similar way as 
private companies were starting to do under the Gandhinager PV Rooftop Program.82 Their hypothesis 
was that if the feed-in tariff offered to farmers was high enough, farmers would economize on water 
use so as to have excess power to sell. In 2012, Tushaar Shah and Avinash Kishore wrote an ITP Water 
Policy Research Highlight in which they proposed the idea (Shah and Kishore 2012). Their argument 
was that the falling cost of PVs meant it was only a matter of time before the Indian government began 
aggressive promotion of solar pumps. This would be good for eastern India, which has surplus water, 
but potentially bad for western and southern India, where there is a water deficit and solar pumping 
could exacerbate groundwater depletion unless incentives were provided to prevent it. The idea of 
solar power as a remunerative crop (SPaRC) was born. Key to the idea was to incentivize farmers to 
sell power back to the grid by making a substantial part of the purchase price a loan to be paid back 
through offering high, but time-limited, feed-in tariffs.83 
 
Also in 2012, the government bailed out the DISCOMs for a second time, reinforcing the need for 
DISCOMs to find a way out of having to provide rural power at prices well below cost. As part of a 




In 2013, ITP met with the Principal Secretary of the Gujarat Energy Department, who asked if ITP could 
implement SPaRC on the ground. At about the same time, the CCAFS proposed a pilot project to do 
the same. ITP agreed to act on both opportunities.84 
 
2014 
In June 2014, and again in January 2015, Tushaar Shah, on behalf of ITP, presented the idea of SPaRC 
to the Minister of Finance as part of a consultation process to develop the annual budget.85 In 2014, 
the government first conceived the KUSUM program to support the use of solar power for tubewell 
irrigation: one of the three components was SPaRC. It is credible to assume that the inclusion of SPaRC 
in KUSUM was because of ITP’s work. 
 
2015 
In 2015, the Government of India launched the Prime Minister’s Krishi Sinchai Yojana (PMKSY) scheme 
with a commitment to invest USD 6.7 billion (INR 50,000 crore) over 5 years in universalizing irrigation 
access.86 This provided an important impetus for irrigation development in India, including for 
expanded use of solar power through KUSUM. 
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Also in 2015, the government was forced to bail out the DISCOMs for a third time,87 adding further 
pressure to find a solution. Each farmer with a grid connection costs the DISCOMs USD 1,000/year,88 
which is paid for by charging other customers more (cross-subsidization) and from grants and bailouts 
from the government. 
 
By 2015, the number of solar pumps in India had increased by more than 13-fold since 2010.89 At the 
same time, a World Bank report found that eight states were in various stages of feeder separation as 
a way to ration farm power. The eight states were Rajasthan, Gujarat, Andra Pradesh, Haryana, 
Punjab, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh.90 
 
As part of agreements made with the Government of Gujarat and CCAFS in 2013, ITP began working 
with a farmer, Raman Parmar, in Thamna village in Gujarat as a proof of concept. CCAFS funding was 
used to provide the farmer with solar panels that were connected both to his pump and the feeder, 
with the help of the utility company MGVCL. After using the pump for four months, IWMI paid the 
farmer INR 7,500 (USD 100) for the 1,500 kWh of energy generated by the panels when not pumping 
water. IWMI paid the farmer because, at this point, MGVCL had not yet agreed to buy back power. 
 
The payment to the farmer generated state and national interest. An article in the Business Standard 
on June 13, 2015 quoted Tushaar Shah as saying:  
 
“Solar irrigation pumps provide farmers water to irrigate their fields and also gives them an 
incentive to sell their remaining power to the grid. Solar power can be a steady source of 
income for farmers. This will also address the issue of groundwater depletion. The buyback 
scheme could also protect farm incomes in the event of crop failure. And, if adopted widely, 
this could help ease pressure on the state’s overburdened electricity board. Solar crops are a 
very exciting example of a ‘triple’ win — for farmers, the state, and the precious water 
reserves, all benefit from a single intervention.”91 
 
Raman Parmar was labeled as India’s first solar power farmer by the Times of India.92 
 
Inspired by Raman, ITP worked with six farmers from Dhundi village to form India’s first solar irrigation 
cooperative – Dhundi Saur Urja Utpadak Sahakari Mandali (DSUUSM) – in December 2015. ITP, with 
funding from CCAFS, replaced their six diesel-powered pumps with solar ones.93 
 
2016 
ITP worked with DSUUSM to erect a minigrid connecting the six farmers to the grid. On May 2, 2016 
DSUUSM signed a contract with the utility company MGVCL to purchase power from them at INR 
4.63/kWh, which was seen as a favorable rate. ITP also paid them a bonus on top of the MGCVL 
payment. The six farmers paid 7% of the equipment cost.  
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On May 9, 2016, DSUUSM was endorsed by the Chief Minister of Gujrat and the following day it was 
commissioned as the world’s first Solar Pump Irrigators’ Cooperative Enterprise (SPICE). Over the 
following six months DSUUSM was seen by about 500 visitors.94 
 
In 2018, a Times of India article quoted Pravin Parmer, secretary of DSUUSM, as saying:  
 
“Until three years ago we used diesel pumps to draw irrigation water. I had to shell out INR 
1,000 per day to buy diesel. Apart from selling excess power we are in a position to sell surplus 
irrigation water to neighbouring farmers as well, at INR 250 per bigha per irrigation. Both of 
these were additional sources of income. Until date, DSUUSM has made INR 10 lakh (USD 
13,300) by selling power and nearly INR 6 lakh (USD 8,000) by selling water.”95 
 
2017 
The SPaRC model continued to generate interest in 2017 and the triple win argument made by Tuhaar 
Shah began to gain traction.96 The idea of SPaRC was attractive to the government, which had 
promised to double farmers’ income as part of the PMKSY (see above). ITP released figures showing 
that a single farmer could generate 13,000 units of power worth INR 65,000 (USD 870) in a year on 
just 1/25th of a hectare. To put this into context, the average income of an agricultural household in 
India is less than INR 108,000 (USD 1,440) per year, of which only about half is contributed by farm 
income (Nabard All India Financial Inclusion Survey 2017). ITP also said that 10 million solar farmers 
could ‘grow’ 130 billion units of solar power and earn up to INR 65,000 crore (USD 8.7 billion) per year 
net of input costs.97  
 
The government was also interested in the purported environmental impacts of more ‘green’ power 
generation that would help it meet its international commitments and reduce groundwater depletion. 
The promise of more reliable power and the opportunity to sell power back to the grid was attractive 
to farmers. Utility companies were attracted by the opportunity to free themselves from the 
commitment to supply farmers with virtually free electricity, which was costing them USD 1,000/year 
for each farmer. In Gujarat, 30% of total power goes to agriculture98 but accounts for just 3% of 
revenue. Farmers pay INR 0.6/unit. GUVNL wanted the price to be nearly six times this figure (INR 
3.5/unit), but such an increase is not politically feasible.99 
 
In short, SPaRC promised to tick a number of boxes for the main stakeholders involved, namely: 
 The opportunity for farmers to double their farm income by selling power back to the grid; 
 Reduction in groundwater depletion; 
 Reduction in loss-making power DISCOMs have to supply to farmers; 
 Reduction in power generated by burning fossil fuels. 
 
The growing interest in SPaRC led to a visit to DSUUSM from the Gujarat Energy Minister. Two months 
later, in June 2017, Gujarat announced the Suryashakti Kisan Yojna scheme, popularly known as SKY 
as part of KUSUM, to contribute to “achieving Prime Minister Narendra Modi's dream to double the 
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income of farmers by year-2022.”100. Given the timing and nature of the SKY scheme, it is highly likely 
that ITP contributed to its formulation. 
 
2018 
In February 2018, the KUSUM scheme was announced, with a budget of USD 50 billion over 5 years. 
The scheme has three parts; namely, to install: 
A. 10,000 MW of decentralized ground-mounted, grid-connected power plants; 
B. 1.75 million stand-alone solar pumps 7.5 hp; 
C. 1 million grid-connected solar pumps 7.5 hp, able to sell back to grid (i.e., SPaRC). 
 
Also in 2018, Maharashtra started a pilot of KUSUM-A for two feeders, in a program that has been 
named the Chief Minister’s Solar Program. Under KUSUM-A, typically a private sector company signs 
a contract with a utility company to provide power to an agricultural feeder at a rate fixed for 25 years. 
The utility provides the land to set up the solar power plants. As far as farmers are concerned, the 
difference they see is that power is provided during daylight hours, which should be more reliable 
than the power previously supplied from the national grid. The attraction of KUSUM-A is that it 
requires very little public sector funding and can be rolled out quickly as a way to increase the 
proportion of renewable power used in agriculture. As of 2020, 1,000 MW of generating capacity have 
been installed under KUSUM-A.101 The State Government of Maharashtra has fixed the purchase price 
at INR 2.97/unit. 
 
One of the question marks over the viability of SPaRC is whether farmers will be willing to give up their 
‘right’ to a grid connection and with it their virtually free electricity for pumping water. The Dhundi 
farmers were willing adopters of SPaRC because they did not have a connection to the grid  and had 
previously been using expensive diesel-powered pumps. Accordingly, ITP worked with the NDDB to 
set up a solar cooperative with farmers who agreed to give up their grid connection. NDDB’s 
experience is described in Box 2 
 
Box 2: The experience of NDDB in supporting a solar cooperative in Gujarat 
NDDB worked with 11 farmers in Majkuva village in Gujarat who were prepared to give up their grid 
connections in exchange for the opportunity to earn income by selling surplus solar power to the grid. 
The farmers paid 15% of the cost of the project, NDDB paid 68% and the balance came from a private 
company, Rajasthan Electronics and Instruments. The project budget was INR 18 million (USD 
240,000). Part of NDDB’s contribution was to help the farmers form a cooperative. The project was 
inaugurated by the Prime Minister in 2018. 
 
As of early 2020, the cooperative has earned INR 700,000 (USD 9,100). The feed-in tariff offered by 
the DISCOM was INR 3.47/kWh with ITP adding INR 2.50/kWh. According to one respondent, the total 
income would have been more if solar panels and poles had not been damaged. Other issues included: 
 Reluctance from the DISCOM to disconnect farmers from the grid because it meant losing 
customers; 
 Uncertainty over whether the DISCOM or the cooperative was responsible for the transformer 
linking the microgrid to the national grid; 
 The need to generate reserves to cover disasters, and to hire a technical person to help with 
maintenance; 
 Jealousy of, and possible sabotage by, neighbors. 
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Despite some setbacks, NDDB remains convinced that solar cooperatives are essential to the success 
of KUSUM because they give farmers bargaining power in negotiations with DISCOMs on feed-in 
tariffs, regular payments and timely resolution of problems connecting to the grid.  
 
2019 
In 2019, the World Bank started working closely with MNRE to prepare a USD 500 million loan, most 
of it for KUSUM-C 
 
On July 9, 2019, Mohinder Gulani, former Adviser on Energy for Europe and Central Asia Region and 
VS Sampath, former Chief Election Commissioner of India, wrote an article in the BusinessLine section 
of the Hindu newspaper entitled “Solar irrigation can transform rural India.” The article projected the 
likely benefits for four feeders in Rajasthan from adopting KUSUM-C (i.e., SPaRC). Its authors found 
that: 
 
“Farm income of a typical farmer would increase by about 30 per cent during the 7-year period of loan 
repayment and by more than 100 per cent thereafter. During drought and crop failure, farmer can 
reduce the scale of agriculture and earn more money from sale of power. Government subsidy is not 
an expenditure but a very profitable investment which would save the government a recurring subsidy 
of INR 56,000 per farmer – a return of about 30 per cent.”102 
 
In December 2019, the World Bank published the results of a large study on Rajasthan’s water-food-
energy nexus that examined different solar irrigation options for the state. The study came out firmly 
in support of KUSUM-C (i.e., SpaRC) over KUSUM-A, in large part because KUSUM-A provides no 
incentive for farmers to pump less water, no pathway for utility companies to free themselves from 
providing subsidized power indefinitely, and no way for farmers to earn money from ‘growing’ solar.103 




In 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic delayed the implementation of KUSUM. At the beginning of the year, 
there were an estimated 21 million pumps connected to the grid and 8.8 million diesel-powered 
pumps. The number of solar pumps had risen to 130,000, mostly added in the 
past 5 years.104 In Gujarat, 12,000 off-grid solar pumps had been installed since 2014, and 2,400 
farmers were enrolled in the SKY program. As already mentioned, Maharashtra had installed 1,000 
MW of solar-generating capacity under KUSUM-A. Despite the start of KUSUM, the next bailout of 
DISCOMs was becoming necessary. 
 









Appendix 3: List of interviewees 
 






M Ministry of New and Renewable 
Energy (MNRE) 
Director  No 
Pramod 
Agarwal 
M CCAFS Head of CCAFS in India Yes 
Mohinder 
Gulati 
M World Bank Former Adviser on 
Energy, Europe and 
Central Asia Region 
Yes 





F IWMI Principal Researcher No 
Akhilesh 
Magal 
M Gujarat Energy Research and 
Management Institute (GERMI) 
Head, Renewable Energy, 
Environment and Energy 
Efficiency (RE4) 
Yes 
R J Vala M GUVNL Solar Division No 
Apoorva Oza M Aga Khan Rural Support Program 
India  
Chief Executive, Aga Khan 
Rural Support Program 
India 
Yes 





M Tata Trusts Executive Director – 










M ITP/IWMI Former IWMI Principal 
Scientist 
Yes 
Shilp Verma M ITP/IWMI Researcher, Water-
Energy-Food Policies 
Yes 
Gyan Rai M ITP/IWMI Consultant Yes 
Divya 
Sharma 
M Swiss Agency for Development 
and Corporation (SDC) 
Project Officer for SDC 




M GIZ Project Leader, Promotion 




M Shashvat Cleantech Managing Director No 
Neha Durga M IWMI Previously worked for ITP No 
Petra 
Schmitter 
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